THE AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION

of the

FOUNDATION

in the

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS.

> Omnia Exercitia nostra quodammodo ad consilium pertinent, ut est manifestum.
>
> P. Hieronymus Nadal.

TRANSLATED

FROM THE FRENCH OF

PIERRE BOUVIER, S.J.

N.B. For reasons easy to understand, these pages are intended exclusively for members of the Society, and it is earnestly desired that they remain in their hands.
Author's request.

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PREFACE

The year 1922 is both the third centenary of the canonization of St. Ignatius (March 12, 1622), and the fourth centenary of the retreat at Manresa (1522) which providentially brought forth for the Society and for the Church the golden book of the Spiritual Exercises.

I offer a modest contribution to the celebration of these precious anniversaries in presenting some notes on the "Foundation", which begins the series of Exercises and contains the great principles on which St. Ignatius bases his strong and fruitful spirituality.

But the reader should not expect to find in these notes a new interpretation of a text four centuries old. Their purpose is rather to recall the oldest interpretation, the only one declared satisfactory and authentic, even in the lifetime of the author, by Father Jerome Nadal, who of all Ignatius' followers seems to have penetrated most deeply into his thought.

A witness of this prestige will perhaps lend some authority and some interest to the pages that follow.

At any rate, I lay them at the feet of St. Ignatius in testimony of my filial devotion.

Paris, January 1, 1922. P. Bouvier, S.J.

The Foundation

of the

Spiritual Exercises

Text and Translations.

I. The Original Text of St. Ignatius.

El hombre es criado para alabar hazer reverencia y servir a Dios nuestro Señor, y mediante esto salvar su anima: y las otras cosas sobre la haz de la tierra son criadas para el hombre, y para que le ayuden en la prosecucion del fin para que es criado. De donde se sigue, que el hombre tanto ha de usar dellas, quanto le ayudan para su fin; y tanto debe quitarse dellas, quanto para ello le impiden. Por lo qual es menester hazernos indiferentes a todas las cosas criadas en todo lo que es concedido a la libertad de nuestro libre albedrio, y no le esta prohibido: en tal manera, que no queramos de nuestra parte mas salud que enfermedad, riqueza, que probreza, honor que dessonor, vida larga que corta, y por consiguiente en todo lo demas; solamenta deseando y eligiendo lo que mas nos conduce para el fin que somos criados.

II Versiones.

1) Versio Antiqua (1541)

Principium et Fundamentum

Homo est creatus ad laudandum Deum et ei exhibendum obseq̃ium et reverentiam et ad salvandum his mediis animam suam; reliqua autem omnia super terram existentia creata sunt ad hoc ut hominem juvent ad prosecutionem finis ad quem conditus est: ex quo fit quod homo eatenus eis uti debet, quatenus eum ad finem suum juvant; atque ab eis abstinere, quatenus ad eum finem impediunt. Quocirca opus est, ut simus indifferentes ad omnia creata quoad concessum est libertati nostrae et non prohibitum.

Itaque ex parte nostra nolimus plus sanitatem quam egritudinem, divitias quam paupertatem, honorem quam opprobria, vitam prolixam quam brevem, et ita de aliis consequenter, solum optemus et eligamus ea quae magis conducunt nos ad finem propter quem creati sumus.

2) Versio Vulgata (1548)

Principium sive Fundamentum

Creatus est homo ad hunc finem ut Dominum Deum suum laudet, ac reveretur, eique serviens tandem salvus fiat. Reliqua vero supra terram sita, creata sunt hominis ipsius causa, ut eum ad finem creationis suae prosequendum juvent: unde sequitur utendum illis, vel abstinendum eatenus esse, quatenus ad prosecutionem finis vel conferunt, vel obsunt. Quapropter debemus absque differentia nos habere circa res creatas omnes (prout libertati arbitrii Nostri subjectae sunt, et non prohibitae); ita, ut (quod in nobis est) non quaeramus sanitatem magis, quam aegritudinem; neque divitias paupertati, honorem contemptui, vitam longam brevi praeferamus. Sed consentaneum est, ex omnibus ea demum, quae ad finem ducunt, eligere ac desiderare.

3) Versio Patris Roothaan

Principium et Fundamentum

Homo creatus est, ut laudet Deum Dominum nostrum, ei reverentiam exhibeat, eique serviat, et per haec (haec agendo) salvet animam suam; et reliqua super faciem terrae (sita), creata sunt propter hominem, et ut eum juvent in prosecutione finis, ob quem creatus est. Unde sequitur, homini tantum utendum illis esse, quantum ipsum juvent ad finem suum, et tantum debere eum expedire, (retrahere) se ab illis, quantum ipsum ad eum (finem) impediunt; quapropter necesse est facere (exhibere) nos indifferentes erga res creatas omnes, quantum permissum est libertati nostri liberi arbitrii, et non est ei prohibitum, adeo ut non velimus ex parte nostra magis sanitatem quam infirmitatem, divitias quam paupertatem, honorem quam ignominiam, vitam longam quam brevem, et consequenter smili modo in ceteris omnibus, unice desiderando et eligendo ea, quae magis nobis conducant ad finem, ob quem creati sumus.

4) English Translation

Man is created to praise, reverence, and serve God our Lord, and by this means to save his soul. And the other things on the face of the earth are created for man, and to help him in the prosecution of the end for which he is created. Whence ot follows that man is to make use of them so far as they help him towards his end, and ought to withdraw from them so far as they hinder him from it. Wherefore, we must make ourselves indifferent to all created things, - in all that is left to the liberty of our free will, and is not forbidden it, - so that, on our part, we do not wish for health rather than sickness, for riches rather than poverty, for honor rather than dishonor, for a long life rather than a short one, and so in all other things, desiring and choosing only that which better leads us to the end for which we are created.

AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION

of the

FOUNDATION.

> Omnia Exercitia nostra quodammodo ad consilium pertinent, ut est manifestum.
> P. Nadal, Apologia pro Exercitiis sancti Ignatii.[1]

At the beginning of the Book of the Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius has placed a consideration to which he attaches the greatest importance. It is a concise and brilliant statement, which begins with truths utterly undeniable, and leads from one deduction to another, to a very lofty perfection: Unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus. Reason goes no further; but it does go this far: in everything, everywhere, and always, to wish and to choose, with regard to our end, only the better. Reason, however, does not tell us sufficiently where the better is to be found, considering our actual, fallen state. To show this to us clearly in the practice of abnegation, and in the exercise of what St. Ignatius calls the third degree of humility, the teaching and especially the example of our Lord Jesus Christ will be necessary. This preliminary consideration is a principle and a foundation; a principle from which flow the conclusions of the purest and most perfect natural morality; a foundation on which the whole spiritual edifice must rest.

A philosophy so simple, so great, so succinct and so complete deserves deep study. The more we apply ourselves, the more truths we discover hidden in this formula; every word, we may say, is a light which should be projected upon the roadway of human life.

The author has determined neither the method to be followed in making this meditation, nor the amount of time that ought to be devoted to it. He clearly supposes that we will stop and reflect until we have understood it and have been penetrated with it. He does not divide the matter into distinct points, as he always does elsewhere; here he gives neither preludes nor colloquies; he leaves the exercitant complete liberty as to procedure.

To help in the understanding of this page, we shall explain its general meaning, and answer the difficulties of detail which it presents, at first sight, and then point out the connection it may have with the rest of the Exercises, and finally how it should be used with regard to the different classes of exercitants.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL MEANING OF THE FOUNDATION.

Article I -- Different Interpretations.

The Foundation comprises two Principles and two Conclusions, of which the second, as we shall see, is drawn from the first; one of which contains a rule of conduct, the other expressing a condition morally necessary for the keeping of this rule.

1st Principle: "Man is created to praise, reverence, and serve God, and by this means to save his soul."

2nd Principle: "The other things on the face of the earth are created for man, and to help him in the prosecution of the end for which he is created."

1st Conclusion: "Whence it follows that man is to make use of creatures so far as they help him towards his end; and he ought to withdraw from them so far as they hinder him from it."

2nd Conclusion: "Wherefore (as a consequence of this rule on the use and avoidance of creatures), we must make ourselves indifferent to all created things. . . desiring and choosing only that which better leads us to the end for which we are created."

On a first reading, this page seems to be perfectly clear, as exact as a theorem in geometry. But as soon as we begin to study it, it offers puzzling difficulties unless we consider it from the point of view of the ascetic of Manresa.

Keeping, first of all, to the general meaning of the text, and to the logical sequence of the thoughts, the only difficulty that presents itself is that of the connection which joins the two consequences to the two principles, and unites them. It is a serious difficulty, for it has misled a large number of commentators.

Except for the contemporaries of St. Ignatius, we may say that before the work of Father Roothaan appeared, the interpreters of the Exercises gave no attention to the Foundation, except to speak of the end of man and the end of creatures. They touched only lightly on indiffer-

ence, and more often than not they failed to present it in connection with the teaching which precedes it. None of them emphasized, as they should have, the final conclusion: Unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus. Moreover, the two very important words: unice, magis, have very strangely been suppressed in the Vulgate, and the Fifth General Congregation, which discovered and, shortly after this official translation, published a certain number of variations from the original text, does not even seem to have noticed this omission which was undoubtedly the most serious of all. Having discoursed on God's glory and everlasting salvation, having shown that creatures were a means which should not be transformed into an end, but used solely as means to arrive at the end, they believed that they had taken all that was useful from the Foundation.

After Father Roothaan, on the contrary, the commentators have very much insisted on the use of creatures and on indifference; but, failing to take the same point of view as St. Ignatius, they have as a rule, done violence to the meaning of their text, and made it say things that it was impossible to justify.

Perhaps, sufficient attention has not been paid, up to now, to the profound disagreement and the irreconcilable differences which exist in the interpretation of this page among the most authoritative commentators of the Exercises. I am here speaking, of course, as in the rest of this work, of commentators who have spoken rather didactically in their interpretations, of authors whose purpose it was to publish not a ready adaptation, but a strict explanation of the text of St. Ignatius.

Thus, the rule for the use of creatures is looked upon by some as a real obligation, while, by others, it is regarded as a formula of very lofty perfection. Of these two conceptions, which is the true one?

The necessity of indifference, of which the second conclusion speaks, has frequently been understood as an absolute necessity, a necessity of duty or even of salvation; but some have seen in it only a relative necessity, a counsel of wisdom and perfection. We must choose between these opposing explanations.

The last words: Unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem are considered by

some as the natural consequence of preceding principles; others, however, see no logical connection with these principles. Who are right?

To these differences in interpretation we should add the differences in the use of this meditation and even in the official texts that are in use.

It has generally been thought that the Foundation ought to be proposed to all retreatants, just as it stands; but there are many who think that in its totality it is suitable only for a select few. With whom are we to agree?

While the Vulgate ends with the words: Ea demum quae ad finem ducunt eligere ac desiderare, the minimum demands of morality, the literal version ends thus: Unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus, the ne plus ultra of perfection. Of two so divergent texts which should be preferred?

In the midst of this confusion, we should like to cast a ray of light. It will take but a few words to set forth the thought of St. Ignatius in all its clarity, to discover the real meaning of the Foundation, and to point out the logical sequence of the propositions which make up this superb synthesis.

As a source of information, we have, together with the original text, the explanations of Father Jerome Nadal especially, whose authority in this matter is exceptional, since he went through a long initiation in the understanding and practice of the Exercises under St. Ignatius, and was officially appointed by him to give the authentic interpretation of them in all the houses of Spain and Portugal.[3] In order to answer the violent attacks of Father Thomas de Pedroche, O.P. (1553), Father Nadal undertook to write an Apology of the Exercises, in which he took occasion to meet and answer the principal problems presented in the matter of the Foundation. This Apology lay in manuscript for more than three centuries in the dust of the archives, and was discovered and published in our day (1895, 1905) by the learned and discerning editors of the Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu.[4]

Article II. Rule for the Use of Creatures.

> Non consulimus solum quod satis sit ad finem consequendum, sed quid melius sit, quid utilius, quid expeditius.
> -- P. Nadal, Apologia, II,840.

After having laid down as principles that man is created to praise, reverence, and serve God, and by this means to save his soul, and that all other things on the earth are created for man to aid him in the attaining of his end, St. Ignatius concludes: "Therefore, man should make use of creatures in so far as they help him to attain his end, and he ought to withdraw from them in so far as they hinder him in attaining that same end."

But what is the exact meaning of this practical rule? Does it give expression to a precept, or does it offer merely a counsel? Does it designate a point beyond which no one may descend without sin, or does it point out a height to which generous souls are invited to climb? It is impossible to avoid this question, for we are dealing with a rule which is the very core of the Foundation, and the application of which will recur constantly in the Exercises that ensue.

It is at this point that the commentators, after unanimous agreement in their interpretation of the two principles, part company. Right here they arrive at a sudden fork in the road. From here on, one group seeks its explanations along the line of the precepts, and the other along the line of the counsels. Travelling on roads so divergent, they not only will never meet again, but they will come to completely contradictory conclusions.

If this rule on the use of creatures expresses an obligation, we cannot disregard it without sin, and a certain number of authors have thus taken it. Father Vigitello (#1859), for example, one of the best interpreters of the Exercises in Italy in the nineteenth century, writes: "This is a rule of the strictest necessity, for it alone, absolutely alone, can lead us to our end. Apart from this rule we cannot serve God; if we do not serve God we cannot save our soul. Therefore, we must follow this rule, or be lost." Dunque o adoperare questa regola o dannarsi.[5]

According to Father Ponlevoy (#1874), we have in this rule a formula of a strict duty. "Notice," he says, "the marvellous proportion expressed by these two words: Tantum quantum. That is the rule. Short of it, or beyond it, there is no longer use, but abuse of creatures; the mean becomes an obstacle. If we go beyond it, we go astray from the necessary order, and we sin both against reason and against morality."[6] He goes so far even as to consider the observance of this rule as necessary for salvation, for he identifies it with the first degree of humility which St. Ignatius declares "necessary for eternal salvation." "The first degree of humility," he says, "is only a development and application of this first conclusion on the end of man: Unde sequitur....There is complete identity."[7]

Father Meschler says: "In the observance of this rule is found the wisdom of life, liberty, reason, order, and happiness: the contrary is disorder, folly, sin, yes, sin!"[8]

In this interpretation, therefore, we must understand this rule only as pertaining to what is commanded or forbidden; for there could be no sin where there is no command or prohibition.

There is in this, however, a perfectly arbitrary restriction; it is neither the literal meaning of the text nor the meaning required by the context. In fact, the text says nothing of what is prescribed or forbidden in view of our end, but of what helps or hinders us in the pursuit of that end: Quae juvant, quae impediunt -- something quite different; for, if we are bidden to pursue that end, if we are bidden, consequently, to employ the means necessary to attain that end, and to avoid the obstacles which make that attainment impossible, we are not bidden to take the means that facilitate that attainment nor to avoid the obstacles that make it difficult; above all, we are not bidden to take the means in the measure that they facilitate the attaining of our end, and to avoid the obstacles in the measure that they make it difficult: Tantum quantum juvant, impediunt. This prudence is eminently praiseworthy, but it is not imposed upon us as a strict duty.

Thus, in the pursuit of our end, communion is an excellent means which we may, which we even must use; but are we obliged to approach the holy table tantum quantum

juvat? Mental prayer is a precious means. Are we obliged to devote ourselves to it tantum quantum juvat? We could say the same about most of the exercises of Christian piety. On the contrary, riches, even when legitimately acquired, are a burden in the effort for salvation, pondus et impedimentum, says St. Ignatius, and our Lord counsels us to get rid of them and distribute them to the poor. But are we obliged to abandon them tantum quantum impediunt?

In explaining the rule of the Foundation in the sense of an obligation, the example has been used of a workman choosing the proper tool for the work he has in mind. But even supposing that the work is of obligation, the workman is not bound to choose the most perfect tool; it will be sufficient if he takes one that is suitable. The traveller is said to choose the route that will bring him to his destination; but between two routes which lead there, he is not bound to choose the more direct. Among many remedies, the sick man chooses that which his health demands; but among several remedies that are equally efficacious, he is not bound to choose that which is most efficacious.

To sum up, neither the text of the Foundation, taken in its obvious meaning, nor the explanations that usually accompany it, justify us in looking upon this rule for the use of creatures as a rule of necessity, whether that be a necessity of salvation, or even a necessity of duty.

There is a necessity of salvation, when an obligation is laid upon us sub gravi, that is, under pain of failure in our last end; there is a necessity of duty at least, when an obligation is laid upon us sub levi, that is, under pain of being delayed, after death, in the enjoyment of our last end. But when no obligation is laid upon us, when we are faced with neither a command nor a prohibition, there can be question only of a counsel of prudence, wisdom, and of perfection.[9]

Now it is just in this sense that the rule of St. Ignatius on the use of creatures presents itself. It does not give expression to an obligation, but simply suggests a counsel.

To go beyond the line laid down by duty is a matter of generosity; to go as far as possible in this way, tantum quantum juvant, impediunt, is a matter of perfec-

tion. Father Roothaan's observation concerning this rule is, therefore, very exact: Ejusmodi est ut altissimam perfectionem comprehendat.

To consider the first rule of the Foundation as a rule of obligation is most assuredly to take the wrong meaning from the text. But what is more, it makes the rest of this page quite inexplicable. For, as we have said, it is not only the text, but the context as well, that is against such an interpretation.

What proves beyond a doubt that the rule of St. Ignatius on the use of creatures is a rule of perfection, and not a rule of salvation or of duty, is the consequence which he immediately draws: Quapropter necesse est facere nos indifferentes erga res creatas omnes. . unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem: "Wherefore, we must make ourselves indifferent to all created things. . . in such manner that we desire and choose only that which is more serviceable to our end."

As the observance of this second rule is a necessary condition of the first, if the first is obligatory, the second becomes equally so. Thus it will be obligatory to be indifferent, and indifferent to the extent of always wishing and choosing the better exclusively. As well say that the distinction between duty and perfection is suppressed. Any interpretation which leads to such a conclusion is plainly inadmissible.

The second rule of St. Ignatius is easily explained, on the contrary, as a necessary consequence of the first, if we see in this first rule a counsel of perfection. We can easily understand, then, that, to observe a counsel, especially a counsel of lofty perfection, certain preliminary conditions must be fulfilled. There is no longer question of absolute necessity, but of one that is relative and conditional. The first rule, containing only a counsel, and consequently not being obligatory, the second, which is only the condition to be fulfilled for the observance of the first, is, on this score at least, no more obligatory than the first. But we must be more specific on this point; we must clearly show what St. Ignatius meant to say by affirming the necessity of indifference.

Article III. -- Necessity of Indifference.

We are here at the heart of the matter, for it is principally on the subject of indifference that the divergence among interpreters of the Exercises becomes most pronounced.

The greatest number of modern commentators seem to have taken Father Roothaan's version in the strictest sense: Necesse est facere nos indifferentes, a translation still more emphasized, after the third Roman edition (1847) by this inopportune note: "N.B. necesse est, medium omnino necessarium." Even going beyond this thought, they have usually presented indifference as necessary with an absolute necessity.

I quote a few whom I have chosen from among the best, and always from among those who are anxious to give as faithful as possible an interpretation of the text of St. Ignatius.

Thus Father Vigitello writes of indifference: "It is not merely a question of justice, of propriety and utility, it is a question of true and strict necessity. Indifference is an indispensable means of salvation."[10]

Father Mercier: "Universal indifference is a disposition necessary to perform duties indispensable for salvation."[11]

Father Bucceroni: "To fail in indifference with regard to a single creature, is to withdraw from our last end."[12]

Father Hummelauer: "Considera hanc dispositionem (indifferentiam) esse aeque necessariam atque ipsum hominis finem. Necesse est facere nos indifferentes quia, si non fecerimus nos indifferentes, non erimus indifferentes; si non erimus indifferentes, non servabimus regulam finis; si regulam finis non servabimus, abutemur creaturis, erimus servi nequam, non salvabimur."[13]

Father Meschler: "The second motive for indifference is its necessity; the contrary is unreasonable, and consequently, sinful."[14]

This interpretation of indifference in the sense of an absolute necessity is not entirely new. It appeared at the very beginning of the Society, and drew the live-

liest protestations from Father Nadal. "Never," he said, "should we have thought it a sin to fail in indifference; we say only that it is preferable to make oneself indifferent in order to achieve the purpose of the Exercises." Nos non intelligimus peccare illum qui non utitur hac indifferentia, sed melius facere illum qui illa utitur ad finem Exercitiorum. 15

"We know very well," he adds, "that without indifference we can observe the commandments and thus enter into the happiness of life eternal." Illi (qui praecepta tantum suscipiunt) possunt sine indifferentia servare mandata et per illa ad vitam ingredi in Christo.16

"If, therefore, we say that indifference is necessary we are giving only a counsel, we are not imposing any obligation." Dicimus debemus moraliter accipiendo, et ut dicat ly debemus debitum ex consilio, non debitum ex praecepto.17

This straightforward and repeated declaration by the confidant of St. Ignatius should suffice to assure us of the meaning attached to indifference by the author of the Exercises. However, it will be worth while to show by a study of the text, that the necessity of which the Foundation speaks cannot be a necessity of salvation, nor a necessity of duty, but that it is simply a relative, conditional, and moral necessity.

#I. -- The necessity of Indifference is neither a necessity of salvation nor a necessity of duty.

> Nos non intelligimus peccare illum qui non utitur hac indifferentia. P. Nadal,Apologia,I,573.

Unless we confuse indifference with resignation, it is clear at once that the absolute necessity of indifference flows neither from the principle of the end of man, nor from the principle of the end of creatures.

The only obligatory consequence which derives from these principles is that we must make use of creatures when they are strictly necessary to make sure of our end, and avoid them when they are strictly forbidden under pain of preventing, or of delaying, after death, the enjoyment of that end. There is, in that case, a question of salvation or of duty. But, to satisfy this obligation, simple

resignation is enough, and we cannot see that indifference should be necessary. For the indispensable disposition which consists in a willingness to sacrifice everything rather than commit a sin, has never been called indifference. The merchant who throws his goods into the sea to save his ship, though sick at heart, is resigned, he is not indifferent; the traveller who is attacked by brigands and leaves them his purse to save his life, is resigned, he is not indifferent; the sick man who consents to the amputation of a limb to save his life, is resigned, but he is far from being indifferent. As St. Francis de Sales very well says, "Conformity to the will of God is had either by holy resignation, or by a very holy indifference."[18] "Resignation," he adds, " prefers God's will to everything else, but it continues to love many things other than God's will. Now indifference is above resignation, for it loves nothing except for the love of God's will."[19]

This explanation is in complete agreement with the thought of St. Ignatius. For the author of the Exercises, as for St. Francis de Sales, what is of obligation is resignation to any sacrifice rather than commit a sin. But "indifference is above resignation," St. Ignatius recommends it, he tries to bring it to life and to root it in generous souls, but he never presents it as necessary with the necessity of salvation or even with the necessity of duty. It is not difficult, but it is most important to prove this, for all the confusion arises from a false interpretation of the indifference spoken of in the Exercises. All the commentators understand perfectly that indifference consists in a detachment from creatures, but what all do not understand equally well is that, if there is a degree of detachment that is obligatory, there is another which is only of counsel, and that for St. Ignatius it is not any kind of detachment, but a complete detachment, which constitutes indifference.

In fact, we can distinguish three degrees in this detachment from creatures.

The first degree consists in a detachment which is ready to do everything and suffer everything rather than commit a mortal sin. This detachment is necessary for salvation, and is what St. Ignatius calls the first degree of humility.

The second degree of detachment consists in a readiness to do everything and suffer everything rather than

commit a venial sin. While not necessary for salvation, this detachment is obligatory under pain of venial sin. It is necessary with the necessity of duty.

The third degree of detachment consists in being so disengaged from creatures that even when there is neither command nor prohibition, when there is question, consequently, neither of mortal nor venial sin, we do not seek them for themselves but solely according to our last end, and in the proportion that they help us in the pursuit of that end.

Since, in accordance with the hypothesis, there is neither a command nor a prohibition, and consequently, no question of sin either venial or mortal, this degree of detachment is not obligatory in any sense; it is undoubtedly as desirable as possible, but it is a matter of counsel and perfection.

Now this third degree of detachment, which is not necessary either with the necessity of salvation or of duty, is precisely what St. Ignatius means by indifference. He is most explicit in his explanation of it.

At the very moment when he is about to speak of indifference for the first time, in order to anticipate all misunderstanding, he declares that he supposes the condition that there is neither command nor prohibition: Quantum permissum est et non prohibitum. This sweeps away at a stroke every idea of obligation, and for the same reason rejects in advance any interpretation which would claim that indifference was necessary with an absolute necessity. Explaining this preliminary remark of St. Ignatius, Father Nadal makes the observation that indifference pertains "to things that God has left to us and which we may freely use or reject, in conformity with God's will, without sin, and even with merit." [20] That we should be counseled to be indifferent even to these things thus left by God to our free choice, we can conceive; it is a restriction which we may freely impose upon ourselves. But that indifference should be presented as obligatory, would be a flagrant contradiction, for then indifference would forbid us precisely that which, in the hypothesis, is allowed us: Permissum et non prohibitum.

To this statement of St. Ignatius and of Father Nadal, which is so explicit as to leave no doubt as to their thought, it would be easy to add a direct proof by showing that indifference in the meaning of the Exercises does not

consist either in the first or in the second degree of detachment, or in the disposition to avoid mortal sin at any cost, or in the disposition to avoid venial sin at any cost.

The interpretation which presents indifference as necessary with the necessity of salvation, in identifying it, consequently, with the disposition to avoid mortal sin at all cost, places St. Ignatius in formal contradiction with himself, since this disposition is exactly what he calls the first degree of humility, and because he places indifference only in the second degree. This interpretation must be set aside; it cannot bear examination, and we wonder how it could have been adopted by a certain number of commentators.

Although more apparently correct, the interpretation which makes indifference consist in the disposition to avoid venial sin at all cost is no more in agreement with the text of the Exercises. St. Ignatius, it is true, places this disposition alongside of the indifference in the second degree of humility, but in placing these two dispositions alongside each other, he is so far from confusing them that he joins them with these words: Y con esto, "and with this," a formula which clearly marks not merely a simple subordination, but a true distinction between the terms thus brought together.[21]

Furthermore, it si not only this passage, but the whole sequence of the Exercises that supposes a radical distinction between indifference and the disposition to avoid venial sin, cost what it may. One can judge for oneself:

1) The indifference of the Foundation leads to the point where we desire and choose only that which makes the pursuit of our last end easier: Necesse est nos facere indifferentes, unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem. A like disposition of willing and of choosing, of acting, consequently, always and solely for the greater glory of God and the sanctification of the soul, is undeniably something quite different from the simple determination to avoid sin, even venial sin, at all costs. One might be determined to avoid all sin without having this constant and exclusive tendency to the better.

2) In speaking of the second degree of humility, St. Ignatius explains what he means by indifference: Secunda

(humilitas) est ut non velim neque afficiar magis ad habendum divitias quam paupertatem . . . ubi equale fuerit servitium Dei Domini nostri et salus animae meae. This is quite different from the simple disposition to avoid venial sin. For, with indifference, one refrains from making a choice between two as long as one does not see which will bring more glory to God and more good to the soul; but with the mere disposition of avoiding sin, it is enough that one does not see a prohibition either from one side or the other, in order to be able to choose at will, and with all the greater reason, if, as in the hypothesis, one would bring equal glory to God, whatever choice one made.

3) If the conclusion of the Foundation was indifference taken in the sense of the disposition to avoid venial sin at any cost, we cannot see why St. Ignatius in the eighteenth Annotation, speaking of what should be given to those who are not fit to make the complete Exercises, says nothing of the Foundation, which would then be one of those simpler and easier Exercises which he mentions. It is still harder to see why Father Nadal formally declares that the Foundation should not be given to those who are satisfied with keeping to the commandments: Qui praecepta solum percipiunt non autem consilia . . . illos non instruimus, ad illos non loquimur. And yet the avoidance of sin, even venial sin, is an elementary duty which is imposed on all, and which it is good to recall to all, to those especially who have made up their minds to be satisfied with observing the commandments. The conclusion of the Foundation, therefore, in the thought of St. Ignatius and of Father Nadal, goes beyond the simple disposition of avoiding venial sin.

4) In his autograph Directory, St. Ignatius expresses the desire that before making the election the retreatant be instructed in the third degree of humility. And yet he regards as incapable of making the election only him who has not yet reached the indifference of the second degree: Qui non est in indifferentia secundi gradus non est (aptus) ad electiones incipiendas (Direct. autogr. III, 1). This is to declare that indifference is necessary, but sufficient for the election.

Now if indifference is merely the disposition to avoid sin, he who makes the election with disposition, recognized as sufficient, can logically, and in the hypothesis, with the approval of St. Ignatius, choose a state of life, though it be the most ordinary and least perfect,

which he would not be bound to give up under pain of sin.

Is it possible that all the work of the Exercises should issue in such a mediocre result? Can this be the election which St. Ignatius has caused us to glimpse from the beginning, and towards which he has not ceased to direct the retreatant: Unice eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem (Fund.); Ut veramus ad perfectionem (Nota ante medit. de Duobus Vexillis); Ut amplectamur optimum (de tribus Binariis, tit.) ? Is this the election for which at different times he has directed the retreatant to implore special graces: Postulare gratiam ad eligendum id quod magis sit ad gloriam divinae suae Majestatis et salutem animae meae (de trib. Bin. 3rd prel.); Petere a Deo Domino nostro ut velit ponere in anima mea id quod magis sit in laudem et gloriam suam (Elect. primus modus, 3ium)?

An explanation of indifference which should involve such improbabilities, to say nothing of such contradictions, cannot be defended.

Thus the text of the Exercises, from whatever angle we regard it, fully justifies the assertion of Father Nadal: Nos non intelligimus peccare illum qui non utitur hac indifferentia. It gives the clearest proof that the indifference such as St. Ignatius understood it, is a detachment from creatures decidedly higher than the simple disposition of avoiding sin at any cost, and that in consequence it cannot be presented as necessary with an absolute necessity.

It remains for us to see in what sense one can nevertheless say that it is necessary to make ourselves indifferent: Necesse est facere nos indifferentes.

#II. The necessity of indifference is a relative, conditioned, moral necessity.

Dicimus debemus moraliter accipiendo. P.Nadal, Apologia, I,573.

1) It is a relative and conditional necessity. This results from everything we have just said. Since indifference is not necessary with an absolute necessity, the necessity of which the Foundation speaks cannot be, in fact, anything but a relative and conditional necessity. It is a question of fulfilling a condition, not absolutely

for attaining our end, or accomplishing a duty, but for the observance of the rule of wisdom and of perfection in the use of creatures.

St. Ignatius wishes to say that in order habitually to use creatures with this prudence and this moderation, there is some necessity of establishing oneself and maintaining oneself in indifference. For, without this detachment of heart and of will, so perfect a discretion would constantly impose a veritable violence, and would result in another instance of: Violentum non durat.

Father Roothaan has well expressed the connection between the two conclusions of the Foundation, perfect use of creatures and perfect indifference: Quapropter, et ut hoc consequamur, ut tam ordinate agamus in usu creatarum, necesse est facere nos indifferentes erga res creatas omnes (Fundamenti explanatio).

Father de la Palma has also pointed out this connection: Si utendum creaturis vel iis abstinendum eatenus est quatenus ad prosecutionem finis vel conferunt vel obsunt, facile patet quod eas considerando in se, ad omnes debeamus esse indifferentes.[22]

2) Still this relative and conditional necessity is no more than a moral necessity. Even if we see in indifference only a condition to be fulfilled in order to conform with a counsel of perfection, it would be arbitrarily straining the thought of St. Ignatius to see in the necessity in question a strict necessity: Omnino necessarium, as writes Father Roothaan; cosa di vera e stretta necessità, as Father Vigitello says; an absolute necessity: Questa indifferenza è assolutamente necessaria, as Father Ciccolini asserts.[23] St. Ignatius, in fact, speaks only of a moral necessity. He merely wishes to say that without indifference it is very difficult or morally impossible habitually to observe the rule of wisdom which he has just proposed. That is what the original text, the Versio Antiqua, and the vulgate give us to understand very clearly. St. Ignatius did not write es necessario, but es menester, which the Versio Antiqua faithfully translates, not by necesse est, but by opus est.[24] The author of the Vulgate has divided the Spanish phrase governed entirely by es menester into two parts: at the beginning of the first part he translates es menester by debemus, and at the beginning of the second part by est consentaneum. Now, he never would

have thought of translating es menester by est consentaneum had he seen in it a strict necessity, omnino necessarium. Father Nadal is also very clear and very explicit: Dicimus debemus moraliter accipiendo, et ut dicat ly debemus debitum ex consilio non debitum ex praecepto.[25]

A fresh proof that in speaking of indifference St. Ignatius intended something else than the disposition to avoid sin at all cost. Such a disposition is not merely of counsel, it is of precept. Father Nadal would not have said of this disposition: Debitum ex consilio non debitum ex praecepto.

3) If we wish a confirmation of all the foregoing explanations, we may find it in Suarez. It will not be without interest to see this weighty theologian give testimony, without intending it, in favor of a thesis which he does not admit.

It is clearly because he understands the necessity of indifference in an absolute sense that he is so plainly embarrassed when he wishes to interpret the last part of the Foundation.

His interpretation is rather odd, and he gives it with a certain amount of hesitation, for he accompanies it with a remark in which some doubt is perceptible: Et hanc existimo fuisse mentem S. P. N. Ignatii.[26]

According to him we must make two categories of the objects which St. Ignatius treats as one, and in connection with which he insists that indifference is especially necessary. Indifference would be obligatory with regard to riches and reputation, but it would be only of counsel and perfection with regard to health and life.

Non recte aequiparantur ibi haec duo genera bonorum (sanitatis et vitae) divitiis et honori.

Non postulatur eadem indifferentia affectus circa illa duo genera bonorum . . . Nam homo non recte faciet, si sit affectus ad honores et divitias propter se, eritque talis dispositio actualis culpa ad minus venialis, saltem ex objecto . . . At vero vitae et salutis est ex his quae propter se appeti possunt . . . et ideo sine culpa potest affectus non esse omnino indifferens circa haec bona secundum se spectata.[27]

Whatever we make of these distinctions, if they are

to be applied here, they would impute a regrettable confusion in the text, since the same word debemus, placed at the beginning of an enumeration must be understood in two senses, the first of which would agree with a part of this enumeration, and the second with the other. The confusion would be all the more complete in that the terms of the enumeration, brought together by Suarez, are separated in the text of the Exercises; regarding the first and the fourth, indifference would be but a matter of counsel, while with the second and the third it would be a matter of obligation. If, by an impossibility, the thought of St. Ignatius had been what Suarez supposes, should we not believe that he would have observed a better order in his enumeration? Truly, if we were to admit such distinctions, they would lessen considerably the merit of this page, since it would end in lines so lacking in precision.

But, in reality, there is no need here for applying these distinctions. St. Ignatius was right in saying that indifference was morally necessary both in regard to health and life as in regard to riches and reputation, if we are going to observe the rule of perfection which he proposes for the use of creatures. But indifference is no more necessary with an absolute necessity in the matter of riches and reputation than it is in the matter of health and life. If anyone wishes to stand on strict duty, a simple resignation to God's will would, strictly speaking, suffice.

This interpretation, the accuracy of which Suarez himself was the first to suspect, will at least have the advantage of showing into what a maze one ventures as soon as he ceases to follow the true thought of St. Ignatius.

Article IV. The last words of the Foundation: "Unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem."

> Vide ad finem Fundamenti quemadmodum rem totam concludamus: eo nostram indifferentiam spectare ut ea eligamus, ea desideremus quae conducunt magis ad finem nostrae creationis consequendum. P. Nadal Apologia, II, 385.

As Father Nadal says very correctly, these last words

are the natural conclusion of all that is contained in the Foundation. And this conclusion has an exceptional importance, for it will become a rule which cannot be lost sight of and which will find its application especially at the most important points of the Exercises. Thus, when the retreatant has to choose his place in Christ's army, or make up his mind at the time of the election, it is this rule which should inspire him: Unice elegendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem. But it is not the influence of this rule which we must here consider; it is rather its meaning in the text of which it forms a part.

We have already observed that these last words of the Foundation bring out clearly the precise meaning which St. Ignatius attaches to the indifference of the Exercises. With him it is not a matter of any kind of indifference, but of an indifference which goes so far as to desire and choose only the better. It is the most perfect indifference conceivable: Omnimoda indifferentia, as the Directory puts it (c. xii, n.2). The authors who have presented indifference as necessary with a necessity of salvation or of duty do not seem to have taken this point into consideration. Any way, they find themselves in an inextricable difficulty when they come to the last lines of the Foundation, and try to make them agree with the necesse est interpreted in an absolute sense.

I see only Father Meschler, who, after having declared indifference necessary under pain of sin, boldly says, apropos of these last words: "This determination to use the better means is as important and as necessary as indifference." [28] All the others stop short when they find themselves driven into this untenable assertion, that it is of obligation or strictly necessary always to desire and choose the better. Most of them have dodged the difficulty; or, indeed, like Father Vigitello and Father Hurmelauer, after having devoted long pages to the interpretation of the Foundation, they say absolutely nothing about these words which seem to demand a special explanation, since they give expression to the disposition in which St. Ignatius endeavors to put the retreatant from the beginning of the Exercises; or, like Father Ponlevoy and Father Mercier, they are satisfied with making a passing allusion to them, but fail to stress the necesse est upon which these words depend. Father Roothaan himself, after having interpreted this necesse est in a strict but not absolute sense, has given only a few lines to the final conclusion, and these merely to call attention to the difference between desiring and choosing.

It is true that in the preceding note, comparing the Vulgate with the Literal version, he had said that the two words, unice, magis, which had been suppressed in the Vulgate give more strength to the thought. In reality, these two words not only strengthen the thought, but alter it entirely. It is one thing to choose the means which simply lead to the end, and another thing to choose only those means which better lead thereto.

Giving up hope, doubtless, of finding a satisfactory explanation, Father Nonell, to whom we owe some excellent works on the Exercises, goes so far as to ask whether the last words of the Foundation are logically deduced from the antecedent principles: Merito hic quaeri posset utrum ex allegatis principiis, logice inferatur desiderandas atque eligendas unice esse illas creatas res, ex se indifferentes, quae magis nobis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus. And at the risk of bringing suspicion on the logical value of this page, he answers in the negative: Mea quidem sententia, haec doctrina ex illis principiis nec infertur nec eam inferre voluit Beatus Pater.[29]

We cannot subscribe to this answer. If it were a question of an absolute necessity, we should be more emphatic still than Father Nonell in answering negatively. But we have seen that this supposition must be discarded, and that there is question of a relative and hypothetical necessity, of a condition to be fulfilled if we wish to observe habitually the rule of perfection which is immediately derived from the two principles. And so, to the question as proposed, we answer, on the contrary, without the slightest hesitation: Haec doctrina ex principiis allegatis logice infertur, et eam inferre certo certius voluit Beatus Pater.

It has likewise been questioned whether indifference, even perfect indifference, goes so far as this exclusive desire and choice of the better, whether it would not have sufficed to say with the Vulgate: Ea demum quae conducunt ad finem eligere ac desiderare. But when we give the matter a little reflection, it is not difficult to see how correct is St. Ignatius' thought, and how exact his expression. By these last words of the Foundation he seems to wish to point out to us at one and the same time the perfection of indifference, the surest means of arriving at indifference, and the true nature of indifference.

First, the perfection of indifference. The most natural meaning of the sentence is that we should make

ourselves indifferent, with the indifference which goes so far as to desire and choose only that which is more useful to us in regard to our end. Father Nadal so understood it: Eo nostram indifferentiam spectare ut ea eligamus, ea desideremus quae conducunt magis ad finem nostrae creationis consequendum.[30]

That perfect indifference implies this consequence is evident. Since creatures no longer have any hold on the soul that has attained to this happy state of independence, there is nothing but its end to attract it and to determine its choice. This is what St. Teresa said: "Neither honors, nor life, nor glory, nor any good whatsoever of soul or body hinders me any longer: I seek no other advantage than the glory of God."

St Thomas has expressed this thought with his usual preciseness: Tanto perfectius animus hominis ad Deum diligendum fertur quanto magis ab affectu temporalium revocatur. And that, he adds, is the aim of all the counsels of perfection: Omnia consilia quibus ad perfectionem invitamur ad hoc pertinent ut ab affectu rerum temporalium avertamur, ut sic liberius mens tendat in Deum.[31]

In addition to pointing out the perfection of indifference, the last words of the Foundation propose the surest means of attaining indifference. The sentence can, indeed, also mean that we ought to make ourselves indifferent, and to that end desire and choose, desiderando et eligendo, only that which is more useful in attaining that end. The efficacy of this procedure is easily seen. In our present state, nature, alas, is not indifferent by itself, inclined as it is by concupiscience towards the creatures which are pleasing to it. The practical means of attaining that balance which is indifference, is no longer to heed sensible attractions, and always to incline towards those creatures which are more useful in the pursuit of our end. This habitual determination, and this frequently repeated exercise will not fail to provide a counterpoise to our more or less vitiated nature and establish us in perfect indifference. "By dint of constantly excluding all other motives," says Father Surin, "we finally succeed in accepting only that of God and becoming indifferent to all else."[32] By contemplating and ceaselessly pursuing the ideal: Unice quae magis nobis conducant ad finem, little by little, we conceive a disgust for the pettiness and trickery that surround us; we succeed in detaching ourselves from those things

In addition to pointing out the perfection of indifference, the last words of the foundation proposes other, truest means of attaining indifference. The sentence continued, also mean that we ought to make ourselves indifferent, and to that end desire and choose, wealth rather than poverty, only that which is more useful in attaining the end. The efficacy of this procedure is easily seen. For instance, nature, also, is not indifferent to [illegible] and it is by consequence how[illegible] [illegible] to it. The greatest [illegible] which is indifferent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

completely and break forth in sighs such as the nostalgia for heaven drew from our saints, Ad majora natus sum ! Quam sordet tellus ! If one is surprised at seeing at one and the same time in the same procedure both the means of acquiring indifference and the effects of the indifference acquired, it will suffice to observe that as a matter of fact it is only by detaching ourselves from creatures that we can attach ourselves to God, and only by attaching ourselves to God that we can detach ourselves from creatures. St. Thomas makes the same observation: Est homo constitutus inter res mundi hujus et bona spiritualia .... ita quod quanto plus inhaeret uni eorum, tanto plus recedit ab altero, et e converso.[33]

Finally, the last words of the Foundation help us wonderfully to understand what is the true meaning of indifference in the mind of St. Ignatius. For him, indifference is not a passive disposition, a sort of quietism. For, if it represses the inclination towards the things of earth, it is to facilitate our ascent towards the things of heaven. It detaches the soul from creatures, only to allow it to move the more freely towards God, to practice without hindrance the utendum tantum quantum of the Foundation, to choose at the time of the election, id quod (senserit) esse magis in laudem et gloriam Dei Domini nostri, of habitually having no other rule than that of the greater glory of God: Vult solum velle vel nolle prout melius videbitur ad servitium et laudem divinae suae Majestatis. (De trib.Binariis)

It is the application of the principle, which we have just seen from the pen of St. Thomas: Tanto perfectius animus hominis ad Deum diligendum fertur quanto magis ab affectu temporalium revocatur .... Ut liberius mens tendat in Deum.

Article V. -- Conclusion

In short, if we wish to have the true interpretation of the Foundation, it will be necessary, and it will suffice, as we have said, to take the same point of view as St. Ignatius. Once the principles on the end of man and the end of creatures are laid down, principles which pertain and are obvious to every man, St. Ignatius no longer addresses those who are satisfied with a mere observance of the precepts. As Nadal says, qui in imperfectione status consistunt ac praecepta solum percip-

iunt non etiam consilia...illos non instruimus, ad illos non loquimur.34 He addresses those exclusively who, not satisfied with practicing the whole of the law, wish to mount higher, and desire the counsels, to advance with a firm step as far as possible in the way of perfection: Qui desiderat quantum possibile est proficere, as he himself had just said in the last of the twenty Annotations. It is to such a man that he points out at the very beginning of the Exercises the summit that is to be attained and the path that leads to it. The soul whom he wishes to instruct should have previously felt aspirations similar to those of the young man of the Gospel. who had observed all the commandments and asked the Divine Master: Quid adhuc mihi deest? It is this question that St. Ignatius seems to answer, as did our Lord of old: Si vis perfectus esse, vade...." It is in the presence of such generous dispositions that he seems to repeat with the Apostle: Ad perfectiora feramur (Hebr. vi/1).Aemulamini charismata meliora (I Cor. xii/31). Such is the formal statement in the Directory: Dispositio quae requiritur in anima ejus qui facit Exercitia haec est ut quantum ex sua parte tendat in id quod perfectius est, si Dominus dederit gratiam et vires. (XIX, 2)

To a soul so disposed, there is no longer any question of recalling obligations, but of proposing counsels. Father Nadal makes a very plain observation to this effect in regard to the Foundation: Omnia Exercitia nostra quodammodo ad consilium pertinent, ut est manifestum.35 Non consulimus solum quod satis sit ad finem consequendum sed quid melius sit, quid utilius, quid expeditius.36 The Directory makes the same observation: In his Exercitiis semper proponitur via perfectior tamquam magis optanda et a Deo petenda. (C.XXIII,4) At the beginning of the Book of the Exercises St. Ignatius might have placed as a motto, the words of St. Paul: Excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro. (I Cor. xii/31)

Certainly, the Exercises can to a greater or less extent, be applied to all souls, and the author himself permits us to take this or that passage from his book for those who are less well disposed, and who have no other purpose than to seek peace of mind: Ut instruantur et ut perveniant usque ad certum gradum contentam reddendi animam suam.(Annot. XVIII). But it is not to such as these that he intends the book in its fulness, it is not for such that he has written at all, it is not such souls that he had directly in view.37 He never loses

To a soul so disposed, there is no longer any question of resulting obligations, but of responding commandments. Nuclear Medical makes a very plain observation to this effect.

chance, it seems, to recall that the Exercises in their fulness are intended only for the few: Raris hominibus .. Nonnisi paucis, he says twice in the Constitutions;[38] Perpaucis, he wrote to Fathers Laynez and Salmeron during their stay at Trent[39]; Admodum paucis, muy pocos, he instructs the Fathers of Portugal.[40] And his two confidants, Fathers Nadal and Polanco use the same language. We have just seen that Nadal dismisses those who are content with the commandments, Polanco is not less exacting when he writes in his Industriae: Ad omnia Exercitia peragenda non sunt admittendi nisi admodum rari.[41] Finally, Gagliardi (* 1607), who was still able to gather the primitive tradition in all its purity, said, speaking of the Exercises: Formula quam pro paucis tantum (B.P.) praescribit.[42]

These observations give us the real key to the Foundation. I do not venture to say that since the time of Father Nadal this key was lost; but I do not think I am wrong in saying that if subsequent authors had always had this key in their hands, it would have enabled them to solve almost all the difficulties, against which they have too often run afoul.

It is then along the line of the counsels, and only along the line of the counsels, that an explanation of the last part of the Foundation after the two principles, is to be sought. The text then offers not a single obscurity. From the first word to the last, everything stands and is connected by a strict and luminous logic.

Whether there is question of the rules for the perfect use of creatures, or for perfect indifference; there is no reason to speak of sin: the counsels do not oblige under pain of sin.

If there is question of necessity with regard to indifference, it is entirely a relative necessity, the necessity of a condition to be fulfilled, if we wish to practice not a precept, but a counsel of perfection.

The final formula itself on the constant and exclusive pursuit of the better, which is absolutely disconcerting, if we place it on the plane of the precepts, is no longer astonishing when we put it on the plane of the counsels; it is the normal result of perfect indifference, the natural consequence of a complete detachment from creatures, the ordinary consummation of

generous fidelity to the counsels which have just been proposed.

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We might abridge this long discussion on the general meaning of the Foundation in this translation and paraphrase:

"Man is created to praise, reverence, and serve God our Lord, and by this means to save his soul:

"And the other things (which are) on the surface of the earth, are created for man, and to help him in the pursuit of the end for which he is created.

"Whence it follows that man (although he is obliged only to use creatures which are indispensable, and to avoid those which are forbidden, still, if he is wise and wishes to tend to perfection) ought to use creatures to the extent that they help him to attain his end, and he ought to abstain from them to the extent that they hinder him in attaining this same end.

"For this reason (as a consequence of this rule, that is, if not content with merely making sure of our salvation and of avoiding sin, which requires only resignation, we wish habitually to practice this rule of perfection and of wisdom) it is necessary (with a moral necessity) to make ourselves indifferent with regard to all created things, in so far as it is left to the choice of our free will and is not forbidden; in such sort that we do not on our part wish for health rather than sickness, for wealth rather than poverty, for honor rather than dishonor, for a long life rather than a short one; and so in all other things, desiring and choosing only those which better lead us to the end for which we are created."

CHAPTER II

PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE FOUNDATION

Article I. Why did St. Ignatius not say that man is created to love God?

The question has often been asked, and it is only a few years ago that M, L'Abbé Fragnière, at the time professor, but since, Superior of the Major Seminary of Fribourg, delivered and published a discourse, which created something of a stir. He went so far as to express his regret over what to him appeared an omission in the first sentence of the Foundation. "I cannot help regretting," he said, "that a sentence so fundamental, and destined to give to the human soul a complete idea of its temporal and eternal destiny, should omit precisely the most necessary and essential word, that of the love of God." 43

Before explaining how St. Ignatius, in the Foundation, has really spoken of love without using the word, and how he there has said of love just what he should have said, putting off until the end of the Exercises his contemplatio ad amorem spiritualem, let me make this observation. Those who put this question to St. Ignatius, should have first addressed it to all the great theologians of the middle ages who have commented on these words of the Master of Sentences without finding anything at all to reprehend: Si quaeratur ad quid creata sit rationalis creatura, respondetur: ad laudandum Deum, ad serviendum ei, ad fruendum eo (II Sent., dist. 1, initio) These are almost the very words of St. Ignatius.

But it is not only the theologians who should have been questioned first, but God Himself. For when He gave His law to Moses, and formulated, at the beginning of the Decalogue, our obligations towards Him, He was satisfied with enjoining us to adore Him, to reverence His Name, and to sanctify the day which He reserved for Himself. There is no more explicit mention of love in the Decalogue than there is in the Foundation of the Exercises.

And yet the Catechism of the Council of Trent teaches that these first three commandments enjoin the love of God: Charitatem in Deum superiora praecepta docent. (P. III, c. v, n. 3). We can say as much of the

text of St. Ignatius.

Referring to the commandments promulgated on Mt. Sinai, St. Thomas asks why God, wishing to give us an exact formula of His law, made no express mention of the two-fold commandment of love. The Angelic Doctor answers in substance that the precepts of the Decalogue are an intermediate form between the higher and general law of love, and the detailed law which regulates all our actions; they are at one and the same time an analysis and a synthesis: an analysis with relation to the great commandment of love, which is contained in them as principles are contained in their proximate conclusions, sicut principia in conclusionibus proximis; and a synthesis with relation to the particular laws, which are themselves also contained therein, but as conclusions are contained in principles, sicut conclusiones in principiis. 44 St. Thomas's observation is as applicable to the text of St. Ignatius as to the text of Moses.

A comparison has sometimes been made, quite naturally, between the three obligations of which St. Ignatius speaks, and the first three petitions of the Pater. To sanctify God's Name is to praise Him; to desire His kingdom is to reverence Him; to accomplish His will is to obey Him. But, Father Grou, in his commentary on the Our Father, has said; "It is proper to remark here that these three first petitions are the most excellent acts of love that we can make; and consequently, fidelity in putting them into practice is a continual exercise of love. I mean of pure love, since God is the direct object, which does not exclude our own happiness, but assures it." 45 Another observation which applies to the text of the Foundation as well as to the Lord's Prayer.

We might be satisfied with observing that the love of benevolence consists in wishing and procuring the good of the beloved, precisely because he is, or because we judge him to be worthy of it, and that, with respect to good, we cannot wish or procure anything better for God than His glory, by praising and reverencing and serving Him, because He is worthy of being praised, reverenced and served. If these acts do not constitute the love of benevolence, in what are we to place it?

But it is easy to prove even more explicitly that the praise, reverence, and service of God, of which the Foundation speaks, cannot be conceived or practiced without love.

text of St. Agustine.

Deference to the commandment, promulgated on St. Michael, St. Thomas cuts why God, wishing to give an exact [illegible] of its law, made no exception to either of the two-fold commandment of love. The merelle Doctor answers in substance that the precepts of the Decalogue are an interpretation from between the higher and general law of love, and the detailed law which regulates all our actions; they are at one and the same time an analysis and a synthesis; an analysis with reference to the great commandment of love, which is contained in them as principles are contained in their proximate conclusions, <u>virtual principia in conclusionibus proximis</u>; and a synthesis because also contained therein, but as conclusions are contained in principles, <u>aliqua conclusa in principiis</u>. Cf. St. Thomas observation as to applicable to the text of St. Agustine as to the text of Moses.

A comparison has sometimes been made, quite naturally, between the three obligations of which St. Agustine speaks, and the first three petitions of the <u>Pater</u>. To exactify Dott's theme is to praise him; to praise his wisdom is to praise him; [illegible] of pure love, also [illegible]

To praise God is to love Him. To be sure, praise, of itself, does not always imply love. We may praise the qualities or brilliant acts of an enemy, and hate him in the depth of our heart. But when there is question of God, true praise, the only kind of which there is thought here, ought to come from the heart. Scripture says that God looketh to the heart: Intuetur cor, it is the heart also which He needs. Praise which is found only on the lips has no value for Him. Populus hic labiis me honorat; cor autem eorum longe est a me. (Mat. 15/8) To praise God is to recognize His infinite perfections, to felicitate Him and to rejoice because of them: it is even if the praise is complete, to make these perfections known and to arouse others to rejoice in them with us. Is not that to procure for God the only good He desires and expects, and does not love consist precisely in rejoicing because of the good of the beloved and in wishing him the good which he still desires? Thus St. Thomas could say that any praise that is worthy of God supposes love: Loquitur Deo laudem dum magnalia operum ejus recogitat cum affectu. [46] Le Gaudier makes the same statement: Laus quae cum notitia gloriam efficit, si perfecta sit et completa, non est sine benevolo affectu voluntatis. [47]

To reverence God is to love Him. "Reverence," says St. Thomas, "is the recognition and witnessing of one's excellence: Honor testificationem importat de excellentia alicujus. [48] As in praise, there is question here of a homage that comes from the heart before it is translated into act. But this recognition and this attestation, as regards God, constitutes the most acceptable homage that we can offer Him, so that here too we have a love of benevolence. Thus we read in the Catechism of the Council of Trent:"He who loves does not always manifest his love by respect and reverence; he who fears does not always love, but he who reveres with his whole heart, by that very fact loves and reveres." Qui amat non semper observat et veneratur, qui metuit non semper diligit; quem vero aliquis ex animo honorat, item amat et veretur. [49] This is also the thought expressed by Father Nadal: Quod vero dicimus finem hominis esse ut Deum laudet et reverentur, id est quod in oratione jubemur petere ut sanctificetur nomen Dei: qui actus est charitatis in Deum. [50]

To praise and reverence God is to glorify Him: Gloria est effectus honoris et laudis. [51] But to glorify God is to love Him. St. Thomas proves this when he explains

the first two petitions of the Our Father, the first of which he connects with the love of benevolence, precisely because by it we desire God's glory, and the second, with the love of concupiscence, because by it we desire to enjoy the glory of God: Finis noster Deus est, in quem noster affectus tendit dupliciter: uno quidem modo prout volumus gloriam Dei, alio modo secundum quod volumus frui gloria ejus; quorum primum pertinet ad dilectionem qua Deum in seipso diligimus, secundum vero pertinet ad dilectionem qua diligimus nos in Deo. 52 "The glorification of God," says Le Gaudier, "constitutes the principal and substantial act of practical love." Est igitur primus et, ut vocant, substantialis charitatis practicae actus, velle Deo omne bonum gloriae ex omnibus creaturis conflatum, quod Idem ipse sibi vult. 53

Est igitur hoc bonum gloriae proprium objectum amoris benevolentiae quo Deum prosequimur, nam aliud ei bonum velle efficaciter non possumus. 54

To serve God is to love Him. "We cannot love God without obeying Him," said Bossuet, "nor obey Him without loving Him." 55 Before him Le Gaudier said: Nulla vera obedientia sine charitate est, ita non potest stare charitas sine obedientia. 56 This was also the teaching of St. Francis de Sales: "Surely, in loving we obey, just as in obeying we love." 57

All obedience, it is true, does not presuppose love, and does not imply love. How often does it happen that we do the will of a man when we are far from loving him! Slavery has many forms, but the obedience of the slave, no matter how unwilling, is none the less obedience. But it is otherwise when it is God Who commands, and when He is obeyed in a reasonable way. Obedience, in that case, even when it is motivated by fear or hope, goes so far as to prefer the will of God to all things, without a single exception, neither health, nor life, nor even the most ardent and legitimate affection for simple creatures. If obedience of this kind is not love, what then is love?

And furthermore, with this general disposition, obedience towards God, if it is complete, embraces the observation of all the commandments, among which that of love is undeniably found. St. Thomas has remarked: Observare omnia praecepta legis homo non potest nisi impleat praeceptum charitatis. 58

Is not this,moreover, what our Lord has taught us: Qui habet mandata mea et servat ea, ille est qui diligit me... Si quis diligit me sermonem meum servabit. (Jn. 14, 21, 23)

Is not this what St. John repeats after his Divine Master: Qui autem servat verbum ejus, vere in hoc charitas Dei perfecta est (I Jn. 2/5): Haec est enim charitas Dei ut mandata ejus custodiamus (I Jn. 5/3)?

In his discourse on the love of God, Bourdaloue sums up the thought of St. Augustine on this point. "On the one hand," he says, "Jesus Christ assures us that if we love Him we will obey His law; and, on the other, He declares that if we obey His law, we will love Him. What then? Is it by charity that the law is fulfilled, or by the fulfilling of the law that charity is practiced? Do we love God because we do what He bids us, or do we do that which He bids us because we love Him? Oh, my brethren, answers this incomparable doctor, let us not doubt that both the one and the other are verified according to the word and the thought of the Son of God."

We must go further. Not only on this page of the Foundation has St. Ignatius spoken of love by speaking to us of all the acts which constitute it, but he has spoken of a very lofty love. Is it an ordinary love that sets God's glory above everything, and explicitly places eternal salvation in second place; a love, which, in the use of creatures is not satisfied with mere obligation, but regulates its use according to what is conducive to the greater glory of God; which in all things looks only to the glory of God, desiring and wishing only that which more contributes to God's glory?

If to seek God's glory in all things is to love Him what shall we say of a love which seeks in all things His greater glory?

But if we must admit that in the Foundation St. Ignatius has spoken of love, and even of a very lofty love, when he says that man is created to praise, reverence and serve God, thus enumerating all the acts which practically constitute the love of God, it remains to look for the reason why he did not, at the very beginning, make some explicit mention of love, and why he postponed to the end of the Exercises the contemplation which treats of love ex professo.

The reason is very simple. The commandment of the love of God binds all men; all must love God with all their soul, with all their heart, with all their strength, they must ceaselessly remain in the disposition of doing all and suffering all to preserve this love; and yet, there are degrees in the habitual practice of the love of God. There are some who, without excluding love and hope. are inspired more by fear; others give love a larger place, but draw their inspiration rather from hope; and finally there are some who, without excluding hope, are inspired more frequently rather by love. In his Exercises St. Ignatius makes the retreatant cover the different phases of the spiritual life. At the beginning of the course, he points out acts that are always strictly necessary; then, along the way, he proposes in their gradation the motives which can determine these acts. It is only at the end that he supposes the soul sufficiently detached from itself to be inspired mainly and habitually by love, to live a true life of love. 59

Furthermore, as the Exercises develop, although he proposes other motives, he never loses an opportunity to arouse the soul to love and to have it ask for love. Only once does he speak of fear expressly, and then to wish that this fear check us on the downward path of sin, if ever we should come to forget love.

Thus the Contemplation ad amorem corresponds to the Foundation, which it completes and of which it is the crown; but between the two there must lie all the labor of the Exercises, leading up to, or confirming the third degree of humility; for, to repeat again the saying of St. Thomas, it is to the extent that the heart is detached from creatures that it tends to God through love: Tanto perfectius animus hominis ad Deum diligendum fertur, quanto magis ab affectu temporalium revocatur.

Article II. Why does St. Ignatius say in the Foundation that man has been created to praise, reverence, and serve God, when everywhere else he says, like the Master of the Sentences, that man has been created to glorify and serve God?

The Master of the Sentences does, in fact, say that man has been created ad laudandum Deum, ad serviendum ei; and St. Ignatius in the course of the Exercises likewise makes use of this formula. Thus in the Twentieth Annotation: Ut serviat Deo Domino nostro eumque laudet; in the

preparatory prayer: Ut omnes meae intentiones, actiones, et operationes ordinentur in servitium ac laudem suae divinae Majestatis; in the oblation in the Kingdom: Dummodo sit majus servitium tuum et major laus tua; in the Three Classes: Tertius vult tollere... prout melius videbitur ad servitium et laudem suae divinae Majestatis; in the Note which follows the Three Classes: Dummodo sit servitium et laus divinae Bonitatis; in the Preamble to the Election: Nihil debet me movere... nisi solum servitium et laus Dei Domini nostri.

The explanation of this difference between the expressions of the Foundation and those which are found subsequently throughout the Exercises is quite easy. The word laudare has two meanings, the one general, to glorify; the other special, to praise. St. Thomas, analysing the idea of glorification declares that glory is the result of praise and reverence, reverence and praise being the means of attesting and making known the excellence of anyone: Gloria est effectus honoris et laudis quia ex hoc quod testificamur de bonitate alicujus clarescit bonitas ejus in notitia plurimorum, et hoc importat nomen gloriae. [60] St. Thomas gives the reason for the distinction between praise and reverence by saying that praise is expressed by word, and reverence by any exterior manifestation of esteem and respect: Laus consistit in solis signis verborum, honor autem in quibuscumque exterioribus signis. [61]

Throughout the course of the Exercises, the author has condensed his thought, and has used the words laus, laudare in their broad meaning, glory, to glorify.

Wishing to say in the Foundation that man is created to glorify and serve God, he has detailed the idea of glorification, which is but the recognition and the proclaiming of God's perfections, whether by word (interior or exterior), or by acts; in the first case, it is praise strictly so-called: Ut laudet. In the second case, it is reverence or worship: Ut revereatur. Hence this analytic formula: Homo creatus est ut laudet Deum Dominum nostrum, ei reverentiam exhibeat eique serviat. It is found before St. Ignatius in the Imitation, in identical terms: Vere tu es dignus omni servitio, omni honore et laude aeterna. [62]

The text of the Foundation is, therefore, perfect in its fulness. It is equally perfect in its arrangement. From the fact that God is, and that He is known in His

greatness and His beauty, He has a right to praise: Ut laudet. And God not only is, but He is present. In His presence we must give witness to our respect and our veneration: Ut revereatur. Finally, God is not only present, but He commands with supreme authority, and to this command we owe obedience. Ut serviat.

Finally, to leave no question unanswered, let us take up another that has often been asked, and which at first sight might seem to be embarrassing. It has been questioned whether it would not be advantageous to substitute for the formula which St. Ignatius uses to express our duties toward God the one which is usually employed: Man has been created to know, love, and serve God.

We have explained why St. Ignatius has not set down the word love, while saying, however, all that he could say of love on the first page of his book. If, besides that, we recall that to love is to know, to recognize and make known, the service of God being likewise explicitly mentioned, we must admit that the formula of the Foundation leaves nothing to be desired either in fulness or in precision of expression. It expresses abundantly all that the other formula contains and it is much more suitable in the place which it occupies in the plan of the Exercises.

Article III. Why and how does St. Ignatius say that all the other creatures on the face of the earth have been made for man?

The thought of St. Ignatius is here very clear, and his statement quite accurate. There would be no reason to pause here in these explanations, if this part of the Foundation had not recently been distorted from its natural meaning and given occasion for an interpretation which involves the most erroneous consequences.

St. Ignatius wishes to say that man is created directly and exclusively for God: Homo creatus est ut laudet Deum...and that other beings incapable of attaining to God are created directly for man: Reliqua propter hominem creata sunt. Doubtless, all creatures have God's glory as their last end: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus. But those which God has placed at the service of man attain their end only by the intermediary of man, that is, by helping man to render God the homage that is His due: Ut cum juvent in prosecutione finis. If

man seeks his end by the use of creatures, creatures have by that very fact fulfilled the role entrusted to them, attained the end that has been assigned them.

The anonymous author of the "Vie interieure simplifiée" has changed all that. But this does not prevent him from offering his book as a commentary on St. Ignatius. "These considerations," he says at the beginning, "will be concentrated on what St. Ignatius in his Exercises calls the Principle and Foundation." (3rd ed. p.13) And it is in that sense that the book has been understood. Father Tissot, in presenting the book to the public, said: "Beginning with the well known Principle and Foundation of St. Ignatius, which he so ably comments on, the authorcomes to conclusions which simple logic suffices to deduce." (p. 1) Cardinal Bourret also said in approval: "After a very lively commentary on the Principle of St. Ignatius, the author rises, by way of consequence, to an analysis of the different degrees of devotion." (p. vii)

But, let us see what, according to the author, is the destiny of creatures. Beings which fill the world about me, "God has created for Himself before all; if He allows me the use of them, it cannot be for myself primarily, but essentially for Himself." (p. 35)

At first sight one might believe that there was only a shade of difference between this formula and that of St. Ignatius. The fact is, there is a complete divergence. The thought of the author is that creatures, placed in man's hands, having been created by God, "before all," for God "essentially," man no longer enjoys the privilege of being their immediate end, he is not their intermediary, he is rather their usher into the presence of God. Thus, in the thought of this author, these creatures fail of their end each time that man uses them without formal relation to God. We can see the consequences that will flow from such a theory. Besides, the author does not hesitate to draw them himself and frankly display them.

"It is hot," he says, "I am thirsty, I drink a glass of water. Evidently in drinking a glass of water there is not the slightest trace of any offence to God. And yet, let us see in practice, why do I drink this glass of water? Because I am thirsty... There, my own satisfaction to the fore. Thirst is the first motive of my action. And where is God's glory? Forgotten, alas!

It is my need, my satisfaction, it is I who take first place.

"Do I not find in this essential disorder, the reversal of the order of my creation. Is this evil a sin? No, it is what we call an imperfection... Imperfection is an evil of the same nature as mortal sin and venial sin, with the sole difference in the gravity of the disorder." (pp. 80-81)

We must be logical. If this is true of the glass of water I drink, it ought to be true of the flower I smell, of the garment I put on, of the fire by which I warm myself, of the light by which I see.. Where shall we stop?

With this theory we are far from the teaching that St. Augustine gave his people, when he told them: "Whatever you do, do well, and you have praised God. You take your repast, avoid drunkenness, and you have praised God. If you engage in business, commit no fraud, no theft, and you have praised God. Do you till the soil? Quarrel not with your neighbors nor your servants, live in peace, and you have again praised God. This is how all day long the blamelessness of your works will be praise of God." [63]

We are far from the teaching of St. Thomas, who held, that for man in the state of grace, every moral act, unless it be at least a venial sin, is not only good, but supernatural and meritorious.[64]

We are far from the common opinion of Catholic theologians, who are unanimous in holding that man is not bound to refer all his actions explicitly to God, and that it will be sufficient to turn his mind and heart from time to time towards the Divine Majesty. [65] In the meantime the creatures which he uses to support and develop his existence attain their end in this sense that they prepare man to offer to God, when the time comes, the sacrifice of praise He expects from him, in the name of creation. Doubtless they can sometimes serve more directly in this praise, either by evoking it, or by acting as instruments thereof, but they attain their end from the moment that man makes use of them, if man is pursuing his own end.

The greater part of creatures are, in fact, granted to man, after the manner of the tithe, formerly distrib-

uted to the priest to provide him with a living and thus allow him to exercise his ministry, and not exclusively after the manner of victims placed in his hands to provide him with holocausts to be sacrificed to God.

But we are insisting too much on a distortion of the thought of St. Ignatius which ought to be forgotten and which will very likely fail to awaken an echo. This distortion is all the more surprising since the text of the Exercises is perfectly clear and unquestionably orthodox. "Man is created for God, and the other creatures which fill the earth are created for man."

Moreover, St. Ignatius has no patent on this thought, as it belongs to all who represent Catholic tradition. We may cite a few.

Lactantius: Cuncta propter hominem Deus fecit, quia usui hominis cuncta cessere. [66]

St. Augustine: Ut tibi totus servirem omnia quae fecisti in meum servitium tradidisti. [67]

St. John Chrysostom: Propter nihil aliud haec omnia produxit (Deus) quam propter hominem quem non multo post, quasi regem et principem, omnibus a se conditis praefecturus erat. [68]

Hugh of St. Victor: Homo factus est ut Deo serviret propter quem factus est, et mundus factus est ut serviret homini propter quem factus est. [69]

Peter Lombard: Sicut factus est homo propter Deum, id est, ut ei serviret, ita mundus factus est propter hominem, scilicet ut ei serviret. [70]

St. Thomas: Creaturae quae sunt infra hominem sunt propter hominem. [71]

CHAPTER III

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FOUNDATION AND THE REST OF THE EXERCISES

Article I Connection between the Foundation and the Exercises as a Whole.

1) Before appealing to the light of faith, as in all the rest of the Exercises, St. Ignatius first addresses reason. He first states the two principles which reason alone establishes, then draws from these principles the conclusions which flow from them for those who wish to strive for perfection. These conclusions will be completed, not contradicted by faith.

Consequently, the Foundation does not suppose our elevation to the supernatural order, nor the degradation and disorder which are the results of our original fall, nor the lessons, example, and sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ.

What he proposes is simply what every reasonable and sensible man must admit, what every prudent man desirous of his own perfection must conclude.[72]

2) It has been said that the Foundation contains all of the Exercises in germ. This statement is not altogether exact. In fact, the Exercises after the Foundation take the supernatural order for granted, and in nature the supernatural order is not contained even in germ.

What we must admit is that the principles which he recalls, the rules which he proposes, the dispositions which he brings to life, marvelously prepare us for all the rest of the Exercises. Omnia Exercitia usque ad ultimum, quod est de perfectione, alicui horum principiorum innituntur.[73] Ut fundamentum fabricae totam ipsam sustinet, ita haec veritas influit in omnia Exercitia; ... et ideo quo melius haec meditatio successerit, eo etiam melius reliqua succedent.[74]

What we must admit is that the Foundation leads logically to a resolution which is the inspiration of all the labor of the Exercises. Once the determination is taken to desire and to choose only what is better, nothing

remains but to seek the better, the better in itself and for itself. This search will be the sole occupation of the retreatant: Exercitia spiritualia ad quaerendam et inveniendam voluntatem Dei. The search for what is better in itself will lead us to the third degree of humility; the search of the better for itself is the proper object of the election, the center towards which everything in the Exercises converges, whether as preparation or as confirmation.

Finally, what we must admit is that the Foundation contains the thesis, and that, throughout all the rest of the Exercises, St. Ignatius applies this thesis to the hypothesis of our supernatural elevation, of our fall, and of our rehabilitation through Jesus Christ.

Article II. Connection between the Foundation and the Kingdom

1) The Foundation presents us with an efficacious means of attaining perfection.

If we were still in the state of justice which was ours when we left the hands of our Creator, if nature were still in her primitive role, and acted only to lead us to God, this indifference would indeed be enough to enable us to go straight towards our end, to pass unscathed through the things of time and without delay or mishap reach the things of eternity, thus bringing to fulfilment the maternal prayer of the Church, Sic transeamus per temporalia ut non amittamus aeterna.

But, unfortunately, there is more to the situation than that. Sin has come into the world. It was committed in heaven and it was committed on earth. And sin has overturned everything in us and about us. Creatures, instead of helping us to good, solicit us to evil; our nature, despoiled and wounded, instead of instinctively rising to the practice of duty, is fascinated by pleasure, and feels itself drawn towards forbidden joys. According to the expression of St. Ignatius, there is disorder in all our operations: Deordinatio operationum mearum.

Who will dissipate the darkness that has shrouded our intellect? Who will strengthen the weakness of our will? Who will help us conquer the enemies who spring up against us on every side along our way?

These are the questions we ask naturally, after the gloomy discoveries of the first week of the Exercises.

It is then that our Lord appears, and Himself offers to direct both the labor necessary to restore the ruins heaped up by sin, and the war so necessary to establish God's sovereignty over the earth. The Kingdom reminds us of this capacity of our Lord as restorer, henceforth to be the one principle of the supernatural order. In the Foundation it was reason which dictated our orders; with the Kingdom, it is Christ our Lord from whom we receive our orders and our direction.

2) The Foundation contains a program of peace, which would have been sufficient for us in an era of tranquillity, such as man knew at the beginning of the world. But, alas, the first week convinced us that the blessed era of primitive peace had but a very brief duration; this short era of peace has been succeeded by an era of universal revolt which is to continue without cease. It is not, henceforth, a program of peace which we need, but a plan of war. Such is precisely the program which our Lord offers and proposes to us when He presents Himself to us as a warrior and conquering King, and when He invites us to enlist with Him and battle under His flag.

The Foundation has no other aim than to introduce us to indifference and establish us therein; the Kingdom lifts us out of indifference to lead us to the practice of abnegation. For the men of spirit whom it enlists, a defensive war is not enough; it throws them boldly into the offensive. Agere contra: that is now their order.

3) The Directory says that the Kingdom is a kind of Foundation, quasi Fundamentum quoddam (c. xix, n. 1.) placed at the beginning of the last three weeks of the Exercises. It is not that the Kingdom is a substitute for the Foundation; it is superposed upon it and adjusts it to the supernatural order.

In the beginning a resolution was taken to make use of all the means placed by Providence within our reach to help us to attain our end, and even to use them to the extent that they facilitate the pursuit of that end. Now, in our present state, the means of attaining the only end that is proposed to us, the supernatural end, is meditation on our Lord, a means both efficacious and necessary: Non est in alio aliquo salus. From this point of view, the Kingdom is only an application of the Foundation.

Another resolution of the Foundation is to desire and to choose only that which best aids us in the pursuit of our end. Now, if the good consists in following Christ and fighting under his standard, the best consists in following him as closely as possible and in signalizing ourselves by fighting with all the enthusiasm of which we are capable to help in the triumph of his cause. As the Exercises suppose Christians who are already enrolled in the service of Christ, the purpose of this contemplation on the Kingdom is not to incorporate them in an army of which they will be a part, but to arouse them to take their place among the flower of his troops, who offer themselves for all sacrifices alongside their great-hearted King who leads them. In inviting us to this glorious combat, the Kingdom merely makes the general resolution of the Foundation more precise.

4) Finally, in the Foundation, the ideal proposed to us is an ideal only glimpsed by reason, of a life completely regulated towards its final end. In the Kingdom this ideal is elevated, it is transformed, and merged with the life of Christ whom we must contemplate unceasingly, and reproduce, if we wish to tend to perfection. It is this study to which St. Ignatius all through the rest of the Exercises is going to apply the retreatant, and nothing can prepare him better for it than this contemplation on the Kingdom, which, in this sense, is indeed a kind of new Foundation: quasi fundamentum.

Article III. Connection between the Foundation and the Two Standards and the Three Classes.

We purposely bring together here the meditation of the Two Standards and the meditation of the Three Classes, as St. Ignatius brought them together in the Exercises, where he expressly states that they be made the same day.

As a matter of fact, these two meditations have the same end, which their setting, otherwise very instructive of itself, has sometimes obscured. They are both directly intended to forearm the retreatant against the temptations which may arise at the moment of the election and compromise the good resolutions of the Foundation.

The retreatant has reached the culminating point of the Exercises. He is on the eve of beginning the work of election, for which, up to this, everything led the way. From the determination he is going to take, will depend

very likely the orientation of his life, and perhaps his lot for eternity. It is a decisive moment. It should not be surprising, therefore, if at such a moment, temptations should grow in number and gravity.

These temptations come as a rule either from the demon or from nature.

When they come from the demon, they are not an open solicitation to evil. In the dispositions in which the retreatant finds himself, such a temptation would have little hope of success. The suggestion bears rather on things in themselves indifferent, and apparently inoffensive. An illusion is produced, entertained, and developed, under pretext, for example, that one can work out one's salvation and even tend to perfection without recourse, necessarily, to the means counselled by our Lord, that many others have sanctified themselves without giving up the world, and without renouncing their goods, that one need not abuse riches, and can even use them to do good to one's neighbor. These specious sophisms may be presented under any number of forms. St. Ignatius calls them fraudes mali Capitis.

When they come from nature, it is weakness and laziness which recoil before the effort necessary to carry out a generous resolution, which temporize and never reduce to practice, or begin to act only by the adoption of half-measures.

To put the retreatant on guard against the temptations of the devil, St. Ignatius proposes the meditation of the Two Standards. In this meditation he unveils the malevolent intention, and the treacherous methods of the tempter, who seeks by riches to lead to the seeking of worldly honor, and by worldly honor to pride, the source of all vices. Over against this, he presents our Lord to the retreatant in all the winsomeness of his meekness and goodness; he makes the retreatant listen to his words so full of candor, and he reveals his strategy as simple as it is loyal: by voluntary poverty he seeks to bring us to a desire of humiliations, and by humiliations to humility, which is the root of all other virtues.

To protect the retreatant against the weakness of nature, St. Ignatius invites him to make the meditation of the Three Classes, in which he must consider the delays and half-measures of an indecisive or listless will.

At the end of each of these meditations, the retreatant is not satisfied, as in the Kingdom, with offering to accompany our Lord through humiliations and poverty, should God deign to call him to this kind of life; he begs God to vouchsafe him this grace and to bestow upon him this vocation.

Doubtless, in these two meditations, which prepare the way for the election, there is question especially of clinching one's fidelity to the engagement entered into at the end of the Kingdom, of following Christ as closely as God will permit in the royal way of the cross. But, over and beyond the Kingdom, these two meditations reach back to the Foundation, for they seek to make sure at the moment of the election the resolution which the Foundation had suggested of always choosing only the better means with relation to our last end.

Article IV. Connection between the Foundation and the Third Degree of Humility.

The three degrees of humility are, by their purport and their place in the Exercises, St. Ignatius' last effort to insure the success of the election.

In the meditations of the Two Standards and of the Three Classes, he has already forearmed the retreatant against the temptations which may appear at this decisive moment. But before having him commence this important deliberation, he wishes to confirm and reinforce still more, if possible, the excellent dispositions in which he find himself. To this end, he does not propose a new meditation, but has him cast his eyes over the principal conclusions to which he has come since the beginning of the Exercises; he has him cast a glance over the entire route he has covered; he offers him an epitome of evangelical perfection, asking him to turn it over again and again in his mind throughout the entire day preceding the election. [75]

But we are considering here only the relation of the Foundation to the third degree of humility. We may say that the third degree of humility completes the Foundation on every point. The Foundation offers us a plan of action: Facere nos indifferentes; it suggests a resolution: Unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem; it proposes a motive: Ut laudet Deum ... et salvet animam suam. The third degree of humility

perfects this plan of action, gives precision to the resolution, and strengthens the motive.

1) The plan of action of the Foundation is indifference; the plan of action of the third degree of humility, like that of the Kingdom, is abnegation, with this difference however, that in the Kingdom abnegation was restricted and limited to the demands of the greater glory of God, while in the third degree of humility, abnegation shakes off this restriction and steps over this limit.

2) The resolution of the Foundation is always to choose only what more perfectly leads us to our end. The Kingdom, after having shown us that this better is to be found in the imitation of Christ, proposes to our generosity the resolution to carry this imitation to the extent of spontaneously embracing humiliations and actual poverty, if we can thus secure God's greater glory. The third degree of humility goes farther still; it suppresses the proviso in the Kingdom, and continues in the way of abnegation so long as it does not see more glory for God in stopping than in continuing.

3) The motive offered in the Foundation is God's greater glory. In the Kingdom, that which spurs to the imitation of Christ is, together with God's greater glory, the bewitching spell of the King who calls us to his standard; it is the justice and importance of his cause, the liberality of his conditions, the magnificence of his promises. In the third degree of humility, the preceding motives retain all their force, but the motive which dominates them and absorbs them is the desire to be like Christ, poor, humiliated, and suffering, the desire to follow him valorously in this rugged career of sacrifice on which we behold him embark for love of us.

If the Foundation is the last word in natural morality, the third degree of humility is the last word in Christian morality. It is here especially that the Exercises are an echo of the Gospel.

Article V. Connection between the Foundation and the Election.

Everything in the Exercises focuses on the Election. And this has not escaped the notice of the principal commentators. Fere Exercitia nostra ad electiones status vitae christianae spectant, says Father Nadal.[76]

Le Gaudier writes: Omnia paene Exercitia ab ipso prope Fundamento ducta ad illam (electionem) pertinent aliquo modo. [77] La Palma, after having explained in what a good election consists, adds: Hic est finis hujus libri Exercitiorum, ad quem se disponere incipit is qui Exercitia aggreditur in Principio et Fundamento.[78] Moreover, St. Ignatius clearly points this out in the very title of the Exercises: Exercitia spiritualia ut homo ... ordinet vitam suam, and in the First Annotation, where he defines the Spiritual Exercises: Quilibet modus praeparandi et disponendi animam ... ad quaerendam et inveniendam voluntatem divinam in vitae suae dispositione.

But it is especially the Foundation which seems to have been written with the election directly in view. For this reason did St. Ignatius wish to reproduce it almost in its entirety before beginning the work of the election.

In reality, the Foundation proposes an objective to us: our last end. It points out a rule, to use or reject creatures to the extent that they help us or hinder us in the pursuit of our end; it counsels a disposition, indifference; it suggests a resolution, to desire and choose only that which most leads us to our end.

It is with this objective and this rule before his eyes, with this disposition in his heart, and this resolution in his will, that the retreatant should make the election. St. Ignatius looks upon these conditions as indispensable for success in the undertaking, to such an extent that he declares him incapable of it who has not yet achieved indifference: Qui non est in indifferentia secundi gradus (humilitatis) non est (aptus) ad electiones incipiendas. [79]

Moreover, this incapacity is easily explained, if we understand the election St. Ignatius proposes to make in the Exercises. It is not a question, for the retreatant, of considering the side he is to choose when duty is concerned. If there is any doubt as to the existence or the nature of the law, it is not a deliberation that he must undertake, but an inquiry. Once the law is proved and understood, there is no further room for deliberation. The line of conduct to be followed is the line of duty set down by the law. Je ne consulte pas pour suivre mon devoir,[80] says one of the characters of Corneille very justly.

But apart from duty, Providence leaves a considerable field to our initiative and generosity. It is here that we shall have to direct ourselves, for the law no longer interposes. But, to direct ourselves, we must decide, and for wise decision, as a rule, there must be deliberation. It is entirely with this deliberation in view that St. Ignatius draws up the rules of election.

The side which he wishes to see us embrace, if we truly desire perfection, is not only a seemly cause, an honorable cause, but the best cause, the cause which will bring greater glory to God and the highest spiritual advantages to our souls: Eligendo quae magis nobis conducant ad finem (Foundation); Ad sequendum id quod sensero esse magis in gloriam et laudem Dei Domini nostri ad salvationem animae meae (First mode of election, 2nd).

We see at once the necessity of indifference if we are to undertake such an election. If the heart is inclined towards the things of earth, how will it have complete independence to declare its preference for the things of heaven? If the ear is always open to the suggestions of nature and to the hubbub of the world, how will it be able to distinguish the whisper of grace, at times so slight and so delicate? If the soul is not free beforehand from all attachment to creatures, how is it going to be influenced in its choice by nothing but its last end?

The Foundation so prepares us for the election by placing before our eyes the end of man, and detaching us from creatures by means of indifference, that, strictly speaking, as one of the interpreters of the Exercises observes, we could immediately after the Foundation pass on to the work of the election, without the slightest loss in the logic of our procedure: Absoluta fundamenti consideratione, possent alicui continuo electionis regulae tradi, quin ad nexum quidquam desideretur.[81]

St. Ignatius, it seems, says practically the same thing, when he declares that indifference suffices to begin the work of election, although the third degree of humility is desirable.

Article VI. Connection between the Foundation and the Contemplation "ad amorem".

These two meditations, the one placed at the begin-

ning, the other at the end of the Exercises, are related from more than one point of view.

The Foundation is an introduction in which the principles which govern all the spirituality of St. Ignatius are stated; the Contemplation ad amorem is a conclusion which crowns this spiritual structure, a synthesis in which all the teaching expounded in the course of the four weeks is epitomized and brought round to the love of God.

In the beginning, St. Ignatius, like a prudent architect, laid his foundation, and on the foundation he has raised his building. The building finished, he had only to set the key-stone in place to insure its solidity. Without an unshakable foundation, the edifice would run the risk of crumbling; without the key-stone in its proper place, it would not take long to collapse. Now the key-stone of the Exercises is the Contemplation ad amorem.

If it is true to say that the Foundation is a preparation for all the Exercises, it is no less true to say that all the Exercises prepare for the Contemplation ad amorem. We may apply to the Exercises what St. Thomas says of the spiritual life: Finis vitae spiritualis est ut homo uniatur Deo, quod fit per caritatem; et ad hoc ordinantur, sicut ad finem, omnia quae pertinent ad spiritualem vitam.[82]

We cannot understand the Exercises without the Foundation, but neither can we understand the Exercises without the Contemplation ad amorem; for the end of the Exercises is to lead us to perfection: Ut veniamus ad perfectionem, and the perfection of man is identified with the love of God: Perfectio hominis sita est in amore Dei.[83] When St. Ignatius has led the retreatant to this final contemplation, he can there leave him to himself, and say with St. Augustine: Ama et fac quod vis. But he must lead him that far, otherwise his direction would be incomplete.

We explained, in the preceding chapter, how the Foundation arouses us to love, and how the Contemplation ad amorem arouses us to the perfection of love.

As a matter of fact, in the Foundation, the love of God could still be associated with motives of personal interest; but when we come to the end of the Exercises, the soul, detached from creatures and detached from itself, should consider only God and seek only God, the object and reason of its love.

Throughout all creation, which is the mirror of divine splendor, St. Ignatius has the retreatant glimpse the Creator in his beauty, in his goodness, in his infinite perfection. Under the charm of this contemplation, the soul feels herself inflamed with the purest love; it would wish to live henceforth on this love alone here below, until it live on it forever in heaven: Amorem tui solum cum gratia tua mihi dones, et dives sum satis, nec aliud quidquam ultra posco.

No one has ever denied that the Contemplation ad amorem ends with a challenge to the purest and loftiest love. But some authors are surprised to see St. Ignatius insist, in the first three points, on the benefits which God has bestowed on us; others have even thought that this whole first part is restricted to arousing a love of gratitude. 84

To this difficulty we could answer a priori that it is hardly likely that at the end of the Exercises St. Ignatius would not have solely in view the most perfect love that man could show to God. But we are not reduced to conjectures; each of the points of this meditation ends with a prayer, the form of which St. Ignatius proposes to us, and which is nothing less than an act of perfect love. If, to awaken such a love, he recalls the benefits that we have received and which we do not cease to receive from the Divine bounty, he is only consistent with himself, beginning always with what is accessible, and in some sense tangible, in order to raise us to loftier thoughts. It is the method he has constantly made use of throughout the Exercises. But, there is nothing like the memory of the innumerable benefits of God, not only to make us understand and feel his infinite goodness, but to arouse us to love him because of this infinite goodness.

He has merely followed the method indicated by St. Thomas, who beholds in the memory of God's benefits the first means of bringing us to the perfect love of God: Ad hoc quod illud praeceptum dilectionis possit perfecte impleri, quatuor requiruntur. Primum est divinorum beneficiorum rememoratio. 85

To one who might object that, after all, loving God because of his favors is only a love of gratitude and not the love of charity, Suarez answers that if this love is inspired by gratitude, it is truly produced by charity.86 In fact, we must distinguish between the motive which inclines us to make an act of perfect love, and the motive

which constitutes an essential part of this act of love. The real reason for the love thus aroused by the consideration of God's benefits, is not these benefits which we receive from God's goodness, but God's goodness from whom we receive these benefits, or, according to the happy expression of Le Gaudier, the goodness of God which shines through these benefits.[87]

Completing this thought, the Wirceburgenses teach that the consideration of the benefits of God in this act of charity plays a role analogous to that of the motives of credibility in the act of faith, the motives af credibility being only the remote and extrinsic reason of the intellectual adherence, properly determined by God's authority. Thus, in the act of perfect charity, God's benefits are only the remote and extrinsic reason of a love properly determined by the goodness of God.[88]

CHAPTER IV

TO WHOM SHOULD THE CONSIDERATION ON THE FOUNDATION BE GIVEN ?

The manner of proposing this consideration should vary according to the different classes of retreatants. Est autem haec applicatio facienda pro ratione personarum, says Father Roothaan, after having explained the first conclusion on the use of creatures.

1)Taken literally and in its fulness, the Foundation is suitable only to those souls who are ready to answer generously the invitations of grace and to advance further and further in the way of perfection. To these souls alone is it prudent to suggest the perfect use of creatures: Utendum tantum quantum together with perfect indifference: Facere nos indifferentes .... unice desiderando et eligendo ea quae magis nobis conducant ad finem ob quem creati sumus.

On this point, moreover, there is no doubt about St. Ignatius' meaning. It is his wish that the Exercises be given in their entirety and in the order laid down by him, to those who have the aptitude and required dispositions together with the free disposal of their time: Tradantur omnia Exercitia spiritualia eodem ordine quo procedunt. (Annotation xx). To those also who have the required aptitudes and dispositions, but not the free disposal of their time, he wishes all the Exercises to be given, one a day, beginning with the Foundation. (Annotation xix). Finally, for those who lack either aptitude or disposition, he points out the parts of the Exercises that might be given them, but says nothing here of the Foundation: Ne Fundamentum quidem explicari jubet, remarks Father Roothaan. And nothing could be wiser than this omission. In fact in the case of sinners, who wish only to be reconciled to God, and from whom it would be obtaining much to get them to consent to return to the way of duty, to purify their conscience, and to break with the occasions that have been their downfall and which will certainly draw them again into sin, to ask a perfection that goes far beyond anything that is of strict obligation, would be to discourage them. Nothing could be more opposed to the formal recommendation of the Exercises not to impose on the retreatant

more than what he can cheerfully bear; Ne tradantur ea quae commode ferre non possit proficere (Annotation xviii). I make the same observation with regard to souls who, although they are not weighed down by sin, are, however, lacking in generosity in God's service, and desire no more than peace of conscience in the performance of duty.

Some years ago, Father Denis, after having quoted the last words of the Foundation, added: Ex his et iis quae de usu creaturarum superius diximus, evidenter apparet non tantum Exercitia integra, sed nec Fundamentum quale jacet omnibus indiscriminatim tradi posse, sed selectis tantum exercitantibus, a quibus magna et perfecta expectari possint.[89] Father Nonell speaks similarly regarding Indifference: Haec profecto non illis proponuntur qui satis sibi fecisse existimant, si media adhibeant ad finem ultimum dumtaxat non amittendum necessaria, sed illis abs dubio, qui finem ultimum quam perfectissime possint obtinere cupiunt.[90] Father Nadal, many years previously, making the same distinction between those who are wanting in generosity and those who wish or are capable of wishing to strive for perfection, expressed himself very clearly in the same sense. Illos (qui in imperfectione status existunt ac praecepta sola suscipiunt non etiam consilia) non instruimus, ad illos non loquimur, sed ad eos solum, qui etiamsi statum perfectionis non acceperunt nec desiderunt, ita tamen se comparant ut Dei voluntatem investigent, ut compertam et boni consulant, et libentissime exequantur, quocunque vocet quamcumque vivendi rationem praescribat. His consultum est indifferentibus esse. Illi possunt sine indifferentia servare mandata et per illa ad vitam ingredi in Christo.[91]

2) If the Foundation, taken literally and in its fulness, is not suitable for all alike, the first and even the second principle, may, however, be given to any one of those who are admitted to make the Exercises, either in whole or in part. It would be prudent, in fact, to recall to each and every one that man is created to glorify and serve God, and by this means to save his soul; that all creatures have been given us as means to help us in the attaining of this double end. The beginning of the Foundation may be considered as one of those parts of the Exercises which St. Ignatius called the simpler and easier, and which he advised to be given to those who did not have the necessary qualitites to make all the Exercises with profit.

If we wished to draw from these two principles conclusions which would be suitable to the dispositions of these souls, it would be enough to say: a) Therefore, we must use creatures to the extent that they are necessary for the attaining of our end, and withdraw from them to the extent that they hinder us; b) consequently, it is necessary for us to be established firmly in the disposition to do everything and to sacrifice everything rather than commit sin.

These conclusions, assuredly, will bring us very far, since, should the occasion present itself, they might demand the sacrifice of one's fortune , or even of one's life. However, they do not contain either indifference properly so called, nor the disposition of desiring and choosing only what is better. It is an easy adaptation, but it is not the text of the Exercises.

3) Finally, we may meet with souls who do not feel they have the courage and generosity to set forth on the road to perfection, but who might profitably be given a glimpse of its glorious heights. This vision may not induce them at once to shake off the apathy that holds them back, but it will leave them a memory which at a given moment, may arouse and inspire them with the desire and enthusiasm they lack. More, it might even be profitable to show them how far the saints have gone, who were not content with avoiding sin, but who, convinced of the truth of the great principles expounded at the beginning of the Foundation, have had the courage to draw and carry out all the practical consequences they contain. It is good even to add that they have gone farther, in imitation of Christ, Our Lord. These are seeds dropped discreetly in souls. Under the action of grace, these seeds may develop little by little, and some day bear precious fruit.

NOTES

1. Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu, Chronicon Soc. Jesu, III, 573.

2. This suppression is all the more inexplicable that the words of the original text have been preserved in all the other primitive versions that have come down to us, and that the Vulgate itself after having removed them from the Foundation, has equivalently kept them in the second degree of humility, and in the rules of election, thus giving, some pages later, two distinct notions of indifference.

3. In a letter written from Cordova (January 1554), to Father Araoz, Provincial of Spain, Father Nadal says, speaking of himself: "Ante novem menses, missit (sic) Rdus noster in Christo P. Ignatius commisarium suum, etsi prorsus eo munere indignum, plena facultate, qui Exercitia interpretetur....Quod hactenus, Christo Jesu duce, egimus in domibus Societatis et Collegiis Portugalliae, atque in hoc collegio Cordubensi agimus, idem acturi in reliquis domibus ac collegiis Hispaniarum, eodem Jesu Christo propitio." Monumenta, Exercitia Spiritualia, pp. 649-650.

4. The Apology of Father Nadal was published in two parts in the Monumenta: the first part in 1895, at the end of the third of six volumes given to the Chronicon Soc. Jesu of Polanco: the second part in 1905, at the end of the fourth and last volume of the Letters of Father Nadal: Epistolae P. Hieronymi Nadal. In quoting the Apology we shall indicate by a roman numeral the first or second part together with the pages of the volume.

5. Questa e l'unica regola d'indispensabile necessità; perchè sola, solissima, conducente alla vita eterna. Senza di essa non si può servire a Dio nell'uso delle creature; senza servirlo non si può salvar l'anima: dunque adoperare questa regola o dannarsi. Vigitello, Meditazioni e instruzioni, 1863, p. 38.

6. P. Ponlevoy, Commentaire sur les Exercices spirituels, 1889, p. 72.

7. P. Ponlevoy, ibid., p. 262.

8. P. Meschler, Méditations des Exercices de saint Ignace de Loyola, 1903, p. 19.

9. Father Matharan has made this distinction in his Asserta moralia, 1890, n. 35:
"Homo non est creatus nisi ut finem suum ultimum, supremam nempe beatitudinem assequatur.
Ergo a) adhibere tenetur et quidem necessario atque sub gravi, sub poena scilicet finem ultimum amittendi, media quae prorsus sunt necessaria ut finem hunc obtineat;
b) Adhibere debet, non sane ita necessario sed sub levi, sub poena, scilicet, retardationis in fine suo assequendo, ea media quibus potest profecto assequi finem, non tamen absque deviatione aliqua;
c) Adhibere potest absque ulla obligatione, quamvis laudabilius et cum majori merito, ea media quae melius et perfectius tantum illum ad eundem finem ducunt, cujusmodi sunt consilia evangelica."

10. Vigitello, loc. cit. pp. 43-44.

11. Mercier, Manuel des Exercices, 1894, p. 205.

12. Bucceroni, Exercices spirituels, 1904, p. 64.

13. Hummelauer, Medit. et Contempl...puncta, 1896, pp. 63-64.

14. Meschler, loc. cit., p. 21.

15. Nadal, Apologia, I, 573.

16. Nadal, Apologia, II, 828.

17. Nadal, Apologia, I, 573.

18. St. Francis de Sales, Treatise on the Love of God, Bk. IX, c. iii.

19. Ibid., c. iv.

20. Dicimus non debere cum differentia nos ad illa habere quae Deus indifferenter reliquit, ut una re vel altera possimus sine sua offensa, immo cum merito et bona ejus voluntate, uti. P. Nadal, Apologia, II, 827.

21. In reality, St. Ignatius distinguished four stages in the upward march to perfection. If he joins the second and the third in a single degree of humility, it is very probable that he wished to keep to the threefold division that is commonly used: incipientes, proficientes, perfecti.

    Father Hummelauer makes the same remark: "Reapse quatuor non tria proponuntur objecta, ideoque non tres sed quatuor ex objectis definiendi essent medii. Neque dicas alterum secundi modi objectum, quod est de peccato veniali, adjici solummodo appendicis instar, ut indifferentia omnino sit principale ejusmodi objectum, id enim ex textu S. Patris nequaquam efficitur, qui ea duo objecta non invicem subordinat, sed plane coordinat formula "item ut" hisp. y con esto, i.e. "et cum hoc." P. de Hummelauer, loc. cit., pp. 27-28.

22. Praxis et brevis declaratio viae spiritualis, 1825, p. 44.

23. P. Ciccolini, Raccolta di Meditazioni e documenti, 1880, p. 220.

24. Opus est is also found in the Latin version of Bl. Peter Faber.

25. Nadal, Apologia, I, 573.

26. Suarez, de Religione, Tract. X, lib. ix, c. v, n. 12.

27. Ibid., nn. 11, 12.

28. Meschler, loc. cit., p. 25.

29. Nonell, Ars Ignatiana, 1888, pp. 34, 35.

30. Nadal, Apologia, II, 835.

31. St. Thomas, Opusc. XVIII, de Perfectione vitae spiritualis, c. 6.

32. Surin, Traité de l'Amour de Dieu, Liv. II, c. 6, p. 85, 1889.

33. St. Thomas, I, 2, q. 108, a. 4.

34. Nadal, Apologia, II, 838.

35. Nadal, Apologia, I, 573.

36. Ibid. II, 840.

37. The first week with its meditations on sin and hell, on death and judgment, would seem to be opposed to this idea of the Exercises. But it will be enough to examine the text to prove that if the matter of this first week is suitable even for sinners who must be brought back to God, its wording is really directed, as are all the rest of the Exercises, only to those souls who aspire to perfection.

    Hence, we find none of those recommendations which are obvious, when there is question of preparing for conversions, no urgent appeal to confession, to the avoidance of occasions, to the struggle against bad habits, to the reparation of wrongs done the neighbor, to the observance of the law of God and of the Church. If there is question of sin and of hell, there is question only of conclusions that are proper to souls already in God's grace; if there is question of examination of conscience, attention is drawn only to those points which could embarrass timid souls: if there is question of a general confession, it is twice insinuated that only confessions of devotion are meant.

38. Constitutiones, P. IV, c. 8; P. VII, c. 4.

39. Orlandini, Historia Societatis Jesu, Lib. 5, c. 25.

40. Monita ad sodales Lusitanos, MHSI, Monumenta Ignatiana, Epist. et Instruct., XII, 677.

41. Polanco, Industriae, V, n. 54.

42. Gagliardi, Commentarii, p. 2.

43. La Voie, sermon preached at the Visitation of Fribourg, November 19, 1897, p. 15.

44. St. Thomas, I, 2, q. 100, a. 3.

45. The Christian Sanctified by the Lord's Prayer, p. 47.

46. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 91, a. 1, ad 2.

47. Le Gaudier, De perfectione vitae spiritualis, 1856, I, 103.

48. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1.

49. Catech. Trid., p. 3, c. 5, n. 7.

50. Nadal, Apologia, II, 830.

51. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3.

52. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 83, a. 9.

53. Le Gaudier, loc. cit., I, 113.

54. Ibid., II, 284.

55. Bossuet, Médit. sur l'Évang., La dernière semaine du Sauveur, 44e jour.

56. Le Gaudier, loc. cit., I, 69.

57. St. Francis de Sales, Treatise on the Love of God, Book XI, c. ix.

58. St. Thomas, I, 2, q. 100, a. 10, ad 3.

59. This teaching is very clearly set forth by Denis the Carthusian: "Quicunque vere et spiritaliter diligit Deum, plus diligit eum quam seipsum ac universum: et nisi homo sic stet coram Deo quod nullet propriam vitam et universa quae habet amittere quam peccando mortaliter Deum offendere, tunc non est in charitate sed in statu damnationis ac culpa mortali...

Verumtamen incipientes et qui in infimo sunt charitatis gradu non solum amant Deum bonaque agunt propter Dei bonitatem et ejus honorem ac virtutis amorem, sed et partim ex timore servili et partim mercedis intuitu, hoc est partim propter seipsos, videlicet ut incommoda sua evadant, suaque commoda seu gaudia consequantur. Non enim sunt pure et plene ad Deum conversi, nec integraliter recti corde, sed partim ad se reflexi.

Similiter proficientes et qui in secundo charitatis gradu sunt contituti, aliquid habent admixtum de timore tormenti, affectioneque commodi seu mercedis per reflexionem ad se, minus tamen quam incipientes. Magis quoque videntur diligere Deum ac facere bona intuitu praemii quam horrore supplicii; ideoque propinquiores sunt puro amori.

Porro perfecti, qui in tertio charitatis gradu

locati sunt, non poenarum formidine, neque mercedis affectu in quantum mercedis, sed ob infinitam Dei bonitatem, majestatem et honorabilitatem amant et colunt ipsum, lineaIiter in ipsum erecti et corde rectissimi." Dionysius Carthus. Summa de vitiis et virtutibus, lib. II, c. 15.

60. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3.

61. Ibid.

62. De Init. Christi, III, c. 10, n.4.

63. St. August., Enarr. 2 in ps. xxxiv, n. 16 P.L. xxxvi, 341.

64. Constat quod ille qui habet caritatem se et omnia sua ordinavit ad Deum, cui inhaeret ut ultimo fini. Ergo quidquid ordinat vel ad se vel ad quodcunque aliud sui meritorie agit, etiamsi actu de Deo non cogitet, nisi impediatur per aliquam inordinationem actus qui non sit referibilis in Deum. Sed hoc esse non potest quin sit peccatum saltem veniale. St. Thos. de Malo, q. 2, a.5, obj. 16.

65. St. Thomas identifies the precept of referring our acts explicitly to God with the precept of producing explicit acts of the love of God: Si quaeratur quando oporteat actum referre in finem ultimum hoc nihil aliud est quam quaerere quando oportet habitum charitatis exire in actum. S. Th. in II, d. 40, q. 1, a. 5. Now, even the severest theologians are far from extending to every day the obligation of making these explicit acts of the love of God.

66. Lactantius, Epistol., c. 69, P.L., VI, 1085.

67. St. Augustine, Solil., c. 19, P.L. XL, 881.

68. St. John Chrysostom, in Gen., hom. 6, n. 5. P.G. LIII 59.

69. Hug. a S. Vict., de Sacram. lib. I, p. 2, c. 1. P.L. CLXXVI, 205.

70. II Sent., dist. I, initio.

71. St. Thomas, I, q. 55, a. 1.

72. "St. Ignatius here prescinds from revelation and faith, and basing himself solely on philosophy and history, makes an appeal to man's common sense in the name of reason alone." P. dePonlevoy, loc. cit., p. 20.

73. De la Palma, Praxis..vitae spiritualis, p. 15.

74. Direct., c. xii, n. 7.

75. Finis hujus meditationis (de tribus humilitatis modis) est in summam redigere fructum omnium considerationum praeteritarum, et confirmare in se omnia proposita et conclusiones quae hucusque factae sunt: et hoc non fit per modum particularis alicujus meditationis, sed considerando tres illos humilitatis gradus subinde et per vices, toto dici decursu. De la Palma, Praxis et brevis declaratio vitae spiritualis, p. 144.

76. Nadal, Apologia, II, 838.

77. Le Gaudier, loc. cit., II, 273.

78. de la Palma, Praxis...vitae spiritualis, 103.

79. St. Ignatius, Direct. autograph., III, 1.

80. Corneille, le Cid, Act. III, v. 80.

81. de Hummelauer, Medit. et Contempl...puncta, p. 10.

82. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 44, a. 1.

83. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 184, a. 1.

84. "The love of gratitude corresponds to the first three points of the Contemplation, in which we consider the benefits of God. To the love of benevolence the fourth point is related, since it includes the motive of pure and perfect love, the love of God for Himself alone and for His infinite perfections." P. Mercier, loc. cit., pp. 387-388.
(Quartum punctum) continet rationem amoris Dei purissimi ac perfectissimi scilicet propter ipsum solum ejusque perfectiones infinitas. Quae ratio Deum amandi merito ad ultimum punctum reservata fuit. P. Roothaan, Exercitia Spiritualia, Contempl. ad amorem, nota 3.

85. St. Thomas, Opuscl. IV, de duobus praeceptis charitatis, c. 4.

86. Respondetur hunc actum (amandi Deum propter beneficia nobis collata) regulariter esse imperatum a gratitudine, tamen elicitive est a charitate. Cum Deus perfecte amatur propter beneficium, potius amatur quia nos amat: hoc autem charitatis est amicitiae. Suarez, de Fide, Spe, et Charitate, tract. 3, disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 3, ad 2.

87. Etsi tot beneficiis ad diligendum provocemur non tamen propter beneficia eum (Deum) diligimus, sed in tot donis resplendens ejus bonitas ipsa propter seipsam amabilis, eadem bona propter seipsam reddit amabilia. Le Gaudier, loc. cit., I, 87.

88. Sicut motiva credibilitatis sunt tantum ratio remota et extrinseca actus fidei divinae, auctoritas vero Dei revelantis est ratio motiva et intrinseca, sic et beneficia divina quibus inducimus ad bonitatem Dei cognoscendam et amandam sunt extrinseca dumtaxat et remota motiva ratio actus charitatis, qui proxime et intrinsece ad bonitatem Dei absolutam terminatur (Wirceburgenses, de virtutibus theologicis, n. 288).

89. Denis, Commentarii in Exercitia spiritualia, 1891 I, 166.

90. Nonell, Ars Ignatiana, p. 34.

91. Nadal, Apologia, I, 573.

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
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